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FOREWORD 
OF THE DIRECTOR
I am pleased to present the European 
Union (EU) Serious and Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment 2017 (SOCTA 2017). The 
SOCTA 2017 is Europol’s flagship product 
providing information to Europe’s law 
enforcement community and decision-
makers. It serves as the cornerstone of the 
EU Policy Cycle for Serious and Organised 
Crime.
The Policy Cycle ensures effective 
cooperation between national law 
enforcement agencies, EU Institutions, 
EU Agencies and other relevant partners 
in the fight against serious and organised 
crime. This is the second edition of the 
SOCTA, following its inaugural edition 
released in 2013. The SOCTA 2017 delivers 
a set of recommendations based on an in-
depth analysis of the major crime threats 
facing the EU. The Council of Justice and 
Home Affairs Ministers will use these 
recommendations to define priorities for 
the coming four years.
The SOCTA 2017 is the outcome of the 
work of many contributors from law 
enforcement authorities in the Member 
States, in countries with strategic and 
operational agreements with Europol, 
our institutional partners in the EU and 
Europol.
Europol is a key partner to the Member 
States in meeting security challenges by 
providing a highly developed platform for 
the exchange of criminal intelligence as 
well as analytical and operational support 
for some of the most complex international 
investigations in the EU to date. In drafting 
the SOCTA 2017, Europol harnessed this 
unique information position.
The SOCTA 2017 represents the outcome of 
the largest data collection on serious and 
organised crime ever undertaken in the EU. 
Europol has been able to use its singular 
intelligence capability as the information 
hub for criminal intelligence in the EU to 
analyse and identify the key crime threats 
facing the EU today.
Informed by its analysis of the prevailing 
threat, the SOCTA 2017 identifies a number 
of key priorities, which, in Europol’s view, 
require the greatest concerted action by 
Member States and other actors to ensure 
the most effective impact. These include 
cybercrime, the production, trafficking 
and distribution of illicit drugs, migrant 
smuggling, organised property crime, and 
the trafficking in human beings (THB). In 
addition, Europol recommends focussing 
on three cross-cutting crime threats with a 
significant impact across the spectrum of 
serious and organised crime – document 
fraud, money laundering and the online 
trade in illicit goods and services. The 
SOCTA 2017 also explores potential links 
between serious and organised crime and 
terrorism.
In 2013, Europol reported the presence 
of at least 3,600 internationally operating 
Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) in the 
EU. In the SOCTA 2017, we identify 
approximately 5,000 international OCGs 
currently under investigation in the EU. This 
increase is primarily a reflection of a much 
improved intelligence picture. It is also 
an indication of shifts in criminal markets 
and the emergence of smaller groups 
and individual criminal entrepreneurs in 
specific criminal activities, especially those 
taking place online. 
These developments highlight the complex 
dynamics that shape the serious and 
organised crime landscape in the EU. They 
also emphasise the need for the continued 
and enhanced exchange of information 
between law enforcement authorities 
as part of their day-to-day business. 
Connecting law enforcement authorities 
and facilitating the real-time 24/7 exchange 
of information remains Europol’s core 
business.
The SOCTA 2017 is a forward-looking 
document that both describes and 
anticipates emerging threats from serious 
and organised crime. In this edition of the 
SOCTA, we highlight the role of technology 
in particular. Criminals have always been 
adept at exploiting technology. However, 
the rate of technological innovation and 
the ability of organised criminals to adapt 
these technologies have been increasing 
steadily over recent years. Developments 
such as the emergence of the online trade 
in illicit goods and services are set to result 
in significant shifts in criminal markets and 
confront law enforcement authorities with 
new challenges.
In identifying and specifying these 
challenges, Europol hopes to provide a 
tangible contribution to the efforts of 
Member States and the EU in fighting 
serious and organised crime. I look 
forward to Europol’s continued support 
for and cooperation with law enforcement 
agencies and other partners in the EU and 
beyond.
4oD 9ainYrigJt
Director of Europol
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INTRODUCTION
6Je 'uroRean 7nion and 'uroRol
The European Union (EU) is a unique 
economic and political partnership 
between 28 European countries.i  It 
was created in 1958 as the European 
Economic Community with the aim to 
foster economic cooperation among its 
six founding partners. Since then, the 
number of EU Member States enlarged 
and the economic union developed into 
an organisation covering a wide range of 
policy areas. The official name changed to 
the European Union in 1993 to reflect the 
broader cooperation on which members’ 
partnership is based. EU law is built 
on a series of treaties, voluntarily and 
democratically agreed by all Members. 
These agreements set out the EU’s goals in 
its main areas of activity. There are three 
main institutions involved in EU legislation: 
the European Parliament, which represents 
the EU’s citizens and its members are 
directly elected by them; the Council of 
the European Union, which represents 
the governments of the Member States 
i The Member States of the EU are: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and 
United Kingdom. 
who share the presidency on a rotating 
basis. The third institution is the European 
Commission, which represents the interests 
of the Union as a whole.
Europol is the EU’s law enforcement 
agency and assists the Member States in 
their fight against serious international 
crime and terrorism. Established as an 
EU agency in 20091 , Europol, or the 
European Police Office, is at the heart of 
the European security architecture and 
offers a unique range of services. Europol 
is a support centre for law enforcement 
operations, a hub for information on 
criminal activities as well as a centre for 
law enforcement expertise. Analysis is at 
the core of Europol’s activities. To give its 
partners deeper insights into the crimes 
they are tackling, Europol produces regular 
assessments that offer comprehensive, 
forward-looking analyses of crime and 
terrorism in the EU.
8
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The SOCTA 2017 is the most comprehensive 
study of serious and organised crime in 
the EU ever undertaken. It is the outcome 
of a detailed analysis of the threat of 
serious and organised crime facing the EU 
providing information for practitioners, 
decision-makers and the wider public. As a 
threat assessment, the SOCTA is a forward-
looking document that assesses shifts in 
the serious and organised crime landscape. 
The SOCTA 2017 sets out current and 
anticipated developments across the 
spectrum of serious and organised crime, 
identifies the key criminal groups and 
individuals active in criminal activities 
across the EU and describes the factors in 
the wider environment that shape serious 
and organised crime in the EU. The SOCTA 
2017 also describes the dynamics that drive 
organised crime in the age of technology 
and reflects on how OCGs and individual 
criminal entrepreneurs seek to exploit the 
latest technological innovations. 
The SOCTA is the product of close 
cooperation between Europol, the law 
enforcement authorities of the Member 
States and third parties such as EU 
agencies, international organisations and 
countries outside the EU with strategic or 
operational agreements with Europol. The 
involvement of these crucial stakeholders 
is also reflected in the SOCTA’s role as the 
cornerstone of the EU Policy Cycle for 
Serious and Organised Crime in the EU.
6Je '7 2olicy Cycle for 5erious 
and Organised Crime in tJe '7
The Policy Cycle provides a robust 
framework that brings together the law 
enforcement authorities of the Member 
States, Europol and a wide range of multi-
disciplinary partners in the fight against 
serious and organised crime. The Policy 
Cycle translates strategic objectives at the 
European level into concrete operational 
actions against serious and organised 
crime.
The Policy Cycle is a methodology adopted 
by the European Union in 2010 to address 
the most significant criminal threats facing 
the EU. Each cycle lasts four years and 
optimises coordination and cooperation on 
the crime priorities agreed by all Member 
States. During the cycle, all concerned 
services and stakeholders, at national and 
EU level, are invited to allocate resources 
and mutually reinforce efforts. Emerging 
threats are also monitored so that they 
can be effectively addressed. Relying on 
the analytical findings of the SOCTA 2017, 
the Council of Justice and Home Affairs 
Ministers of the EU will decide on the 
priorities in the fight against serious and 
organised crime for the second full Policy 
Cycle from 2018 to 2021. These priorities 
will determine the operational work carried 
out in the framework of the Policy Cycle 
for the next four years. The crime priorities 
agreed at European level in the context of 
the Policy Cycle are reflected in operational 
activities at Member State level.
6Je 5OC6# /etJodology
As part of an iterative process, the SOCTA 
Methodology has been further developed 
and refined by experts at Europol and from 
the law enforcement authorities of the 
Member States. The SOCTA Methodology 
allows Europol to understand and assess 
serious and organised crime holistically. 
The SOCTA analyses and describes criminal 
markets and crime areas in the EU; the 
OCGs or individual criminals carrying out 
these criminal activities; as well as the 
factors in the broader environment that 
shape the nature of serious and organised 
crime in the EU. Using a mixed methods 
approach of qualitative and quantitative 
analysis techniques and a set of clearly 
defined indicators, Europol is able to 
identify and specify the most threatening 
criminal phenomena in the EU. Europol 
arrives at the recommended priorities for 
the fight against serious and organised 
crime for the Policy Cycle based on this 
Methodology. The SOCTA Methodology 
ensures transparency and reliability 
providing decision-makers with a solid 
basis for their deliberations. The SOCTA 
Methodology is a public document and can 
be accessed online.2
Data and sources
The findings of the SOCTA 2017 are the 
outcome of detailed analysis of intelligence 
gathered as part of the largest data 
collection on serious and organised crime 
ever undertaken in the EU. Member States, 
cooperation partners outside the EU and 
institutional partners contributed more 
than 2,300 questionnaires on crime areas 
and OCGs. The amount of data provided 
for the SOCTA 2017 has more than doubled 
compared to the SOCTA 2013. 
In addition, Europol relied heavily on 
the operational intelligence held in 
its Analytical Workfile on Serious and 
Organised Crime (AWF SOC) to provide 
a thorough and extensive analysis of the 
criminal threats facing the EU. Where 
appropriate, the data collected through 
questionnaires and available in Europol’s 
databases were complemented by 
information from open sources. 
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The SOCTA 2017 is the most 
comprehensive study of 
serious and organised crime in 
the EU ever undertaken.
Serious and organised crime in 
the EU features a great variety 
of criminal activities, which are 
increasing in complexity and scale. 
The profits generated by some of 
the successful OCGs and individual 
criminals active in the EU are 
enormous and rival those of multi-
national corporations. 
More than 5,000 OCGs operating 
on an international level are 
currently under investigation 
in the EU. The number of 
OCGs operating internationally 
highlights the substantial scope 
and potential impact of serious 
and organised crime on the EU.
Criminals quickly adopt and integrate new 
technologies into their modi operandi or build 
brand-new business models around them. The 
use of new technologies by OCGs has an impact 
on criminal activities across the spectrum of 
serious and organised crime. This includes 
developments online, such as the expansion 
of online trade and widespread availability of 
encrypted communication channels, as well 
as other aspects of technological innovation 
such as more accessible and cheaper high-
performance drone technology. Technology has 
a fundamental and lasting impact on the nature 
of crime. 
Document fraud, money laundering and the online trade in illicit goods and 
services are the engines of organised crime in the EU. Although neither 
document fraud nor money laundering have a direct impact on most citizens in 
the EU, they facilitate most, if not all, other serious and organised crime. The 
online trade in illicit goods and services is expanding rapidly. Almost all types of 
illicit goods are now bought and sold via online platforms that offer the same 
ease of use and shopping-experience as most legal online platforms. Depending 
on the type of commodity and service, this includes platforms both on the 
surface web and the Darknet. Data is also traded as a commodity. The online 
trade in illicit goods and services is foreseen to increasingly disrupt established 
criminal markets and their traditional distribution model over the next few 
years. 
KEY JUDGMENTS
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ORGANISED 
CRIME GROUPS
TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINES OF ORGANISED CRIME
Many of the OCGs are highly 
flexible and display great 
adaptability in the speed with 
which they adjust their modi 
operandi or whole business models 
to changes in the environment. 
Many criminal activities are 
increasingly complex and require a 
variety of skills as well as technical 
expertise to carry out.
The most threatening OCGs are 
those which are able to invest 
their significant profits in the 
legitimate economy as well as into 
their own criminal enterprises, 
ensuring business continuity 
and a further expansion of their 
criminal activities. The involvement 
in serious and organised crime 
may allow some terrorist groups 
to generate funds to finance 
terrorism-related activities.
An increasing number 
of individual criminal 
entrepreneurs offer Crime-as-
a-Service (CaaS). The online 
trade in illicit goods and services 
enables individual criminals 
to operate their own criminal 
business without the need for 
the infrastructures maintained 
by ‘traditional’ OCGs. 
Cybercrime is a key challenge to digital 
economies and societies. Cyber-dependent 
crime is underpinned by a mature CaaS 
model, providing easy access to the 
tools and services required to carry out 
cyber-attacks. Child Sexual Abuse (CSE) 
perpetrated online is increasingly profit 
driven. The growth of card-not-present 
(CNP) fraud, coupled with successful 
industry measures to tackle card-present 
(CP) fraud, has resulted in CNP fraud 
accounting for 66% of total card fraud value.
Migrant smuggling has emerged as one 
of the most profitable and widespread 
criminal activities for organised crime in 
the EU. The migrant smuggling business is 
now a large, profitable and sophisticated 
criminal market, comparable to the 
European drug markets.
The illicit drugs market remains the largest 
criminal market in the EU. More OCGs 
are active in the production, trafficking 
and distribution of illicit drugs than any 
other phenomenon. The industrial-scale 
production of synthetic drugs within the EU 
continues to expand and cements the EU 
as a key source region for these substances 
distributed worldwide. OCGs maintain 
complex trafficking operations cooperating 
with OCGs on a global scale to orchestrate 
the wholesale importation of illicit drugs 
into the EU. Within the EU, the majority of 
OCGs involved in the distribution of illicit 
drugs deal in multiple illicit drugs, also 
called poly-drug trafficking.
THB for labour exploitation is increasing and 
is expected to continue to expand. OCGs are 
expected to exploit the presence of a large 
number of potentially vulnerable persons 
in the EU following the migration crisis. 
Labour exploitation threatens to undermine 
the legitimate labour market lowering 
wages and impeding economic growth.
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CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
Organised property crime encompasses a 
range of different criminal activities carried 
out predominantly by highly mobile OCGs 
operating across the EU. A steady increase 
in the number of reported burglaries over 
recent years is a particular concern in many 
Member States.
UNDERSTANDING 
ORGANISED CRIME
OCGs are as varied as the markets they 
service and the activities they engage in. 
In many cases, OCGs reflect the societies, 
cultures and value systems they originate 
from. As societies across Europe become 
more interconnected and international in 
outlook, organised crime is now also more 
connected and internationally active than 
ever before. 
Since the year 2000, the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime has provided an 
internationally shared definition of an 
organised criminal group as “a group of 
three or more persons existing over a 
period of time acting in concert with the 
aim of committing crimes for financial or 
material benefit.” This definition was also 
adopted in the EU’s Council Framework 
Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 
2008 on the fight against organised crime 
and continues to reflect law enforcement 
authorities’ conceptualisation of organised 
crime across the world. However, this 
definition does not adequately describe 
the complex and flexible nature of modern 
organised crime networks. 
OCGs operate in a criminal economy 
dictated by the laws of supply and demand 
and are favoured by social tolerance 
for certain types of crime such as the 
trade in counterfeit goods and specific 
frauds against public authorities or large 
companies. These factors will continue 
to shape the organised crime landscape. 
Individual criminals and criminal groups 
are flexible and quickly adapt to exploit 
new victims, to evade countermeasures or 
identify new criminal opportunities. 
DEFINING SERIOUS AND 
ORGANISED CRIME
Who
How
What
CRIMINAL NETWORKS
CORRUPTION
TECHNOLOGY
DOCUMENT FRAUDCRIMINAL FINANCES
(MONEY LAUNDERING)
ONLINE TRADE
COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST LAW 
ENFORCEMENT
VIOLENCE AND
EXTORTION
CYBERCRIME
Child sexual exploitation 
Cyber-dependent crimes
Payment card fraud
DRUG PRODUCTION 
TRAFFICKING AND
DISTRIBUTION
ILLICIT WASTE 
TRAFFICKING
FRAUD
Excise fraud
Investment fraud
Mass marketing fraud
Payment order fraud
Value Added Tax fraud
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CRIME
MIGRANT SMUGGLING
TRAFFICKING 
OF FIREARMS
ORGANISED
PROPERTY CRIME
CURRENCY
COUNTERFEITING
SPORTS 
CORRUPTION
TRAFFICKING IN 
HUMAN BEINGS 
TRAFFICKING OF 
ENDANGERED SPECIES
ORGANISED CRIME 
GROUPS
CRIMINAL EXPERTS
CaaS
CRIME AS A SERVICE
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ORGANISED CRIME GROUPS (OCGs) 
AND OTHER CRIMINAL ACTORS
The OCGs and individual criminals 
operating in the EU are highly diverse. 
They range from large ‘traditional’ OCGs 
to smaller groups and loose networks 
supported by individual criminals, who are 
hired and collaborate ad hoc. More than 
5,000 OCGs operating on an international 
level are currently under investigation in 
the EU. This figure does not necessarily 
reflect an overall increase in organised 
crime activity in the EU compared to 2013, 
when Europol reported on the activities of 
3,600 internationally operating OCGs in the 
EU. This increase is primarily a reflection 
of a much improved intelligence picture. 
The increase also points to the emergence 
of smaller criminal networks, especially in 
criminal markets that are highly dependent 
on the internet as part of their modi 
operandi or business model. Overall, the 
number of OCGs operating internationally 
highlights the substantial scope and 
potential impact of serious and organised 
crime on the EU.
The criminal markets involving illicit drugs, 
trafficking of human beings and migrant 
smuggling attract the largest numbers 
of OCGs and continue to generate the 
greatest profits among the various criminal 
markets in the EU. However, emerging 
crime phenomena such as the online trade 
in illicit goods and services may eclipse 
these markets in size and profits in the 
future. The online trade in illicit goods 
and services is no longer merely a modus 
operandi, but an expanding, highly dynamic 
and substantial criminal market itself.
Over the past few years, criminals of 
more than 180 nationalities were involved 
in serious and organised crime in the 
EU. The majority of OCGs operating on 
an international level are composed of 
members of more than one nationality. 
Nonetheless, the majority of the suspects 
(60%) involved in serious and organised 
crime in the EU are nationals of a Member 
State.
The diversity of the criminal 
actors operating in the EU is 
also reflected in the structures 
of the OCGs. 30% to 40% of 
the OCGs operating on an 
international level feature 
loose network structures. An 
approximate 20% of these 
networks only exist for a short 
period of time and are set up 
to support specific criminal 
ventures. Hierarchically 
structured OCGs continue to 
dominate traditional criminal 
markets. 
The fragmentation of the 
serious and organised crime 
landscape and the emergence 
of more groups and looser 
networks detailed in the 
SOCTA 2013 did not affect 
all criminal markets. The 
fragmentation of criminal 
markets was particularly 
pronounced in relation to highly 
cyber-dependent criminal 
activities. Around these types 
of activities, an increasing 
number of individual criminal 
entrepreneurs come together 
on an ad hoc basis for specific 
criminal ventures or to deliver 
CaaS.
5,000 
international OCGs 
currently under 
investigation
>180 
nationalities 
involved
30-40% 
LOOSE
20%
SHORT TIME 
VENTURES
Most OCGs are organised
HIERARCHICALLY
24%
up to ﬁve 
members
60%76%six or more 
members
of the suspects involved in serious and 
organised crime in the EU are EU nationals. 
5tructure
ComRosition
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#ctiXities 
More than one third of the OCGs active in the 
EU are involved in the production, trafficking 
or distribution of drugs. Other key criminal 
activities for OCGs in the EU include organised 
property crime, migrant smuggling, THB and 
excise fraud.
2olycriminality
45% of the OCGs reported for the SOCTA 
2017 are involved in more than one 
criminal activity. The share of these poly-
criminal groups has increased sharply 
compared to 2013. 
OCGs also often engage in more than 
one criminal activity to mitigate risks, 
reduce operational costs and increase 
profit margins. The OCGs involved in the 
trafficking of illicit goods are the most 
poly-criminal groups in the EU. These 
groups typically traffic more than one illicit 
commodity such as counterfeit goods or 
different types of illicit drugs. 
Many OCGs are highly flexible and able 
to shift from one criminal activity to 
another or to add new criminal activities 
to their crime portfolio. In many cases, 
OCGs operate on an on-demand basis 
and only become active once new profit-
opportunities emerge.
The integration of digital systems in many 
criminal activities and the expansion of the 
online trade in illicit goods and services 
is transforming serious and organised 
crime. Criminals are increasingly adapting 
the supply chain models of global online 
retailers.  
The concept of CaaS has been an emerging 
feature of various criminal markets for 
some years. However, increasingly OCGs 
also openly advertise ad hoc opportunities 
for individual criminals to provide them 
with support or expertise for specific 
criminal ventures. 
OCGs operating on an international 
level are typically active in more than 
three countries (70%). A limited number 
of groups is active in more than seven 
countries (10%).
Since 2012, Europol has been supporting the German-led ISEC project 
on “Strengthening cross-border operational cooperation in the fight 
against mobile organised crime groups (MOCGs) from the Baltic Sea 
Region, including Russian-speaking MOCGs”. The project has resulted 
in the dismantling of more than 100 OCGs. A total number of 575 
arrest warrants were issued. The damage caused by the MOCGs 
targeted by this project exceeded EUR 65 million. These MOCGs mainly 
carried out organised property crime, drug trafficking, document 
counterfeiting and money laundering.
Drug trafﬁcking
Organised 
property 
crime
Migrant 
smuggling
Trafﬁcking in 
human beings
Excise fraud
Involvement of OCGs active in the EU in different crime areas
Sharing Economy 
An increasing number of individual criminal 
entrepreneurs come together on an ad hoc 
basis for speciﬁc criminal ventures or to 
deliver CaaS
Poly-criminality
TRENDS
45%
of the OCGs reported for the SOCTA 
2017 are involved in more than one 
criminal activity
Many OCGs have expanded their 
crime portfolio in response to the 
sustained high level of demand for 
smuggling services during the 
migration crisis.
7 out of 10 
OCGs are typically active in more than three countries
INTERNATIONAL 
DIMENSION AND MOBILITY
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CorruRtion 
OCGs use corruption to infiltrate public 
and private sector organisations relying 
on bribery, conflicts of interest, trading in 
influence and collusion in order to facilitate 
their criminal activities. Corruption distorts 
legitimate competition and erodes public 
trust in authorities and legal systems.
Corruption is used to enable all types of 
criminal activity. However, the prevalence 
and scale of corruption associated with dif-
ferent crimes vary.  Some criminal activities 
use corruption as an integral part of their 
modus operandi. 
Corruption is increasingly facilitated by on-
line services. Some criminals use cryptocur-
rencies and alternative banking platforms 
to transfer funds to their accomplices in the 
public and private sector. The use of these 
techniques makes it more difficult to detect 
financial flows and to uncover corruption.
8iolence and eZtortion
OCGs tend to avoid the use of violence. Violence usually attracts 
law enforcement attention, which is often incompatible with the 
profit-driven motivations of those involved in organised crime.
OCGs mostly employ violence against members of their own or 
competing OCGs. Violent crimes targeting rival OCGs often take 
place in the context of “turf wars” over territory or influence. OCGs 
extort property or money from individuals by intimidating their 
victims, threatening to carry out serious bodily injury and murder. 
Very few OCGs engage in extortion as their core activity. Some 
OCGs offer to carry out racketeering and extortion as a service 
for other criminal networks and lend “professional extorters” to 
affiliated OCGs. 
Hostage takers kidnap, hold and release individuals in exchange 
for ransom payments. In the EU, this criminal activity is not widely 
carried out by OCGs. However, OCGs involved in migrant smuggling 
have been known to use the threat of kidnapping in order to extort 
debt payments. 
Countermeasures against laY enforcement
Countermeasures are the actions and behaviours of individual 
criminals and criminal groups to disrupt or prevent law 
enforcement activities against them. OCGs use various 
countermeasures to recognise and mitigate law enforcement 
actions. 
The application of countermeasures requires an awareness of the 
methods and techniques used by law enforcement authorities in 
investigating criminal networks. 
OCGs use a number of countermeasures to secure their 
communication against law enforcement surveillance. These 
include technical countermeasures such as the use of encryption, 
foreign and pre-paid SIM cards or satellite telephones as well as 
reliance on code. To evade physical surveillance during transport, 
OCGs frequently change vehicles, often hired or leased using 
fraudulent IDs.
16 UNDERSTANDING ORGANISED CRIME
OBTAIN 
INFORMATION
STAY OFF
THE RADAR
SUPPORT
ACTIVITIES
Obstruction of justice
Witness intimidation
Avoid controls
Upcoming controls
Ongoing investigations
Conﬁdential data
Ease transport
Obtain permits
Bid rigging
OBJECTIVES OF CORRUPTION
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ENGINES OF ORGANISED CRIME
Document fraud, money laundering and the online trade in illicit 
goods and services are the engines of organised crime. These 
cross-cutting criminal threats enable and facilitate most, if not all, 
other types of serious and organised crime. The business models 
of OCGs active across the spectrum of serious and organised crime 
rely on document fraud, money laundering and online trade to 
maintain their criminal enterprises. 
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CRIMINAL FINANCES AND MONEY LAUNDERING
Money laundering sustains 
and contributes to the 
growth of criminal markets 
across the EU.
Money laundering is linked 
to virtually all criminal 
activities generating criminal 
proceeds.
Money laundering allows OCGs to 
introduce the proceeds of crime into the 
legitimate economy. Almost all criminal 
groups need to launder profits generated 
from criminal activities. However, the 
way in which money laundering is carried 
out varies greatly depending on an 
OCG’s level of expertise as well as the 
frequency and scale of money laundering 
activities. Criminal networks continuously 
seek to exploit the latest technological 
developments such as cryptocurrencies 
and anonymous payment methods. Rapid 
transaction processing and the proliferation 
of effective anonymisation tools are 
significant obstacles in the identification of 
the beneficial owners of criminal proceeds. 
A growing number of online platforms and 
applications offer new ways of transferring 
money and are not always regulated to the 
same degree as traditional financial service 
providers. Money launderers heavily 
rely on document fraud to facilitate their 
activities. Fraudulent documents such as 
false invoices and forged ID documents 
are used to conceal the origin of criminal 
cash, to open bank accounts or to establish 
shell companies. Money launderers provide 
services to both organised crime and 
terrorist organisations.
OPERATION KOURI 4
In 2016, a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) 
composed of French, Belgian and Dutch 
investigators, Eurojust and Europol 
dismantled a complex network involved in 
the laundering of drug trafficking proceeds 
based in Morocco. Cash couriers travelling by 
car collected up to EUR 1 million per month in 
cash across Western Europe and transported 
it to Belgium and the Netherlands to be 
transferred to Morocco via the Middle East 
using the Hawala system. The operation 
resulted in the seizure of more than EUR 7.1 
million in cash.
OPERATION SNAKE 3
In 2015, Europol supported Spanish 
authorities in dismantling a Chinese network 
involved in the laundering of criminal 
proceeds from THB for labour exploitation, 
the production of counterfeit goods as well 
as excise tax fraud. Relying on middlemen 
and third parties, the OCGs had established 
complex corporate structures and various 
accounts to transfer money to China. In 
addition to their main criminal activities, 
the group also offered money laundering 
and international remittance services to 
other OCGs based in the EU in exchange for 
a negotiated percentage of the laundered 
funds. Between 2009 and 2015, the European 
branch of this OCG had laundered more than 
EUR 340 million. 
/oney laundering syndicates
OCGs increasingly use money laundering 
syndicates acting as illegal service 
providers to launder money. In exchange 
for a commission of between 5% and 8%, 
these syndicates offer complex laundering 
techniques and carry out the laundering 
operations on behalf of other OCGs. 
CasJ
Cash remains at the core of the money 
laundering business. Cash continues to be 
smuggled by couriers and, increasingly, by 
post and parcel services. 
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OPERATION SNAKE
MONEY LAUNDERING 
SYNDICATES
relying on a network of 
middlemen and complex 
laundering techniques
TRADE-BASED MONEY 
LAUNDERING
False invoicing and forged ID 
documents are used by shell 
companies owned by OCGs to 
conceal criminal funds
NEW PAYMENT METHODS
such as cryptocurrencies and 
anonymous payment methods are 
signiﬁcant obstacles in the 
identiﬁcation of the beneﬁcial 
owners of criminal proceeds
CASH SMUGGLING
by couriers or using post 
and parcel services
ORGANISED
CRIME GROUPS
TERRORIST
ORGANISATIONS
MONEY LAUNDERING
Most common methods
OPERATION KANDIL 5 
A 2016 investigation by French, Spanish, 
German and Dutch law enforcement 
authorities disrupted an OCG laundering the 
proceeds generated by the trade of heroin. 
This OCG collected proceeds throughout the 
EU and laundered the funds in Middle Eastern 
countries relying on cash couriers and trade-
based money laundering techniques. The 
OCG purchased expensive second-hand cars, 
heavy machinery and construction equipment 
in Germany in cash and exported them to 
Iraq where they were again sold for cash. The 
group then used Money Service Businesses 
and Hawala to introduce the funds into the 
legitimate financial system, leaving virtually 
no paper trail. 
6radeDased money laundering 
Trade-based money laundering is a highly 
effective way of concealing criminal funds 
by manipulating or forging purchases or 
sales using double invoicing, false invoicing, 
over- and under-invoicing by companies 
that are owned by OCGs, their associates 
and relatives.
0eY Rayment metJods
New payment methods such as 
cryptocurrencies, prepaid cards, online 
payments and internet vouchers are 
continuously emerging and are generally 
less well-regulated than traditional 
payment methods. In combination with 
alternative banking platforms, these new 
payment methods allow the movement 
of large amounts of criminal funds. 
Underground banking systems are financial 
networks operating outside of normal 
banking channels to transfer money 
internationally, avoiding the fees and 
regulations of conventional banks.
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DOCUMENT FRAUD
Document fraud is a key facilitator for 
organised crime. Document fraud entails 
the production and use of counterfeit 
documents as well as the use of 
genuine documents obtained by means 
of deception or misrepresentation. 
The production and use of fraudulent 
documents has also been linked to terrorist 
actors. Document fraudsters and forgers 
manipulate or produce all types of identity, 
travel and administrative documents. 
Fraudulent documents are used and traded 
extensively among OCGs and represent 
a significant obstacle in the fight against 
serious and organised crime. Fraudulent 
IDs are in high demand and are the most 
commonly traded type of fraudulent 
document. Increasingly, fraudulent 
documents are traded online. Online 
marketplaces are used by criminals to 
display the range of genuine documents on 
offer and allow document forgers to receive 
orders directly from clients.
The use of fraudulent 
documents in the EU has 
signiﬁcantly increased. It 
represents a signiﬁcant threat 
to the EU.
7nderstanding tJe different tyRes of document fraud
BERLIN CHRISTMAS MARKET ATTACK
On 19 December 2016, a Tunisian suspect 
drove a truck into a Christmas market in the 
centre of Berlin, Germany. The terrorist attack 
left 12 people dead and 56 others injured. 
The perpetrator was a rejected asylum 
seeker from Tunisia and had previously been 
suspected of involvement with the Islamic 
State. After his asylum claim was rejected, the 
suspect travelled throughout Europe using 
multiple identity documents under different 
aliases.
Document fraud is a key 
enabler of all types of criminal 
activity as well as terrorism. 
Document fraud is also 
expected to emerge as one of 
the fastest growing criminal 
markets over the coming years. 
High-quality counterfeit 
documents are primarily 
produced by highly specialised 
counterfeiters.
Fraudulent documents are 
increasingly traded online and 
trafﬁcked using post and parcel 
services.
LOOKALIKE
Used by someone other 
than the legitimate owner, 
based on physical 
resemblance
OCGs dealing with 
genuine documents 
exploit weaknesses in 
the issuance chain of 
documents and 
beneﬁt from the easy 
citizens can claim 
new ones
FORGED
A genuine document with 
some alterations
COUNTERFEITED
An entirely fabricated 
document
STOLEN BLANK
from administration and 
ﬁlled with the clientŨs 
biographical data
FRAUDULENTLY 
OBTAINED
through false supporting 
documents or corruption
EXPIRED
Used by its legitimate 
owner after its expiry date
GENUINE 
DOCUMENT
FALSE 
DOCUMENT
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THE MAIN CRIME AREAS LINKED TO OR SUPPORTED BY DOCUMENT FRAUD
DOCUMENT FORGERY AND MIGRANT SMUGGLING 6
In May 2016, Greek and Czech law enforcement authorities arrested 
several suspects involved in the forgery of documents and migrant 
smuggling as part of an international investigation supported by 
Europol. The forged documents were subsequently provided to 
irregular migrants to enter the EU or to legalise their stays there. The 
investigation in Greece highlighted the structure and the hierarchy 
of the Athens-based network. The fees for the forged documents 
ranged from EUR 100 to EUR 3,000 per piece depending on the 
quality, type and country of issue. The documents forged by the 
criminal group included passports, national ID cards, visas, driving 
licences, asylum seekers’ registration cards and residence permits.
6Je Rroduction of forged 
documents
Increasingly sophisticated security features 
protecting documents against forgery 
as well as improved technical control 
measures have compelled OCGs to improve 
the quality of fraudulent documents. 
Suppliers of raw materials now primarily 
rely on Darknet marketplaces to sell their 
products.  
$reeder documents
Breeder documents are documents that are used to obtain other 
forms of legitimate identification for the purpose of establishing 
a false identity. Fraudulent breeder documents are typically used 
to apply for genuine travel and identity documents and driving 
licences. Birth certificates, marriage records, work contracts or 
invitations to stay in the EU are forged in order to obtain visas, 
residency or work permits on false grounds.
6Je sale and rental of genuine 
documents
The sale or rental of travel and identity 
documents such as passports is an 
increasing concern. There has been a 
significant increase in the number of 
lost and stolen documents in circulation. 
Instability and armed conflicts often allow 
criminal groups to obtain blank documents 
from the affected regions. This is also 
true for conflict zones on the periphery of 
the EU and has been highlighted by the 
widespread availability of thousands of 
non-EU blank identity documents.
Migrant 
smuggling
Property crimeMoney laundering 6rafﬁcking in 
Human Beings
Fraud TerrorismDrug 
trafﬁcking
# multiRurRose tool
Fraudulent documents are multi-purpose 
criminal tools and each document can 
be used repeatedly to support different 
criminal activities. Documents forgers are 
service providers often cooperating with 
multiple OCGs involved in various criminal 
activities.
BIRTH CERTIFICATE
MARRIAGE RECORD
WORK CONTRACT
INVITATION TO STAY IN THE EU
VISA
RESIDENCY PERMIT 
WORK PERMIT
FORGED VALID
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Child Sexual
Exploitation
Material 
Malware and 
cybercriminal 
services
Trafﬁcking 
of ﬁrearms
Counterfeit 
medicine
Illicit drugs
Stolen 
goods
P2P
Peer-to-peer (P2P) 
platforms use clients 
running on users devices to 
allow customers and 
vendors to connect directly 
with each other.
SOCIAL MEDIA
STANDARD BROWSING
Surface web platforms 
selling illicit commodities 
are often easy to ﬁnd 
using simple internet 
searches, using a 
standard browser.
Illicit commodities, 
especially drugs and 
counterfeit goods, are 
increasingly advertised 
and sold on social media 
platforms.
MARKETPLACES
Vendors often attempts to hide 
illegal goods among legal 
products.
TOR BROWSING
The Darknet is a distributed 
anonymous network within 
the deep web that can only be 
accessed using software such 
as TOR, I2P and Freenet.
ONLINE TRADE IN ILLICIT GOODS AND SERVICES
cultural goods, excise tobacco, firearms, 
heroin, hormonal substances, specimens 
of endangered species, stolen vehicle parts 
and accessories, synthetic drugs and new 
psychoactive substances (NPS), as well as 
compromised payment card data are sold 
and purchased online. 
It is not only illicit commodities that are 
traded online, but also criminal services. 
The expanding CaaS business model 
provides customers with access to a wide 
range of criminal services. A prime example 
of this is cybercrime, where customers 
can access such services as malware 
coding, Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) services, bulletproof hosting and 
anonymisation services, botnet hire and 
money laundering.
Vendors often attempt to hide illegal 
goods among legal products on online 
platforms on the surface web. In some 
cases, surface web vendors redirect their 
customers to mirror sites on the Darknet or 
advertise their products using false product 
designations or descriptions.
The online market caters to dealers who 
buy in bulk for re-sale as well as individual 
users. The diminishing reliance on access 
to street networks of consumers of illicit 
commodities challenges the established 
business models in many criminal markets.
The online trade in illicit goods 
and services has been expanding 
steadily over recent years. It 
is expected that this trade will 
continue to grow rapidly for 
the foreseeable future and that 
online platforms will emerge as 
a key distribution platform for all 
types of illicit goods in the EU.
The Darknet is a key facilitator 
for various criminal activities 
including the trade in illicit 
drugs, illegal ﬁrearms and 
malware. Darknet marketplaces 
are becoming increasingly de-
centralised.
6rade on tJe surface YeD
The distribution of illicit commodities via 
online platforms has soared in recent years 
and is expected to continue to increase 
steadily over the coming years. Online 
trade offers the opportunity to reach a 
huge number of potential customers. Illicit 
goods purchased online are predominantly 
trafficked using postal and parcel services. 
6Je Darknet
The Darknet is a distributed anonymous 
network within the deep web that can only 
be accessed using software such as The 
Onion Router (TOR), I2P and Freenet. While 
these tools were ostensibly developed 
for the purpose of legitimately protecting 
freedom and privacy, confidential business 
activities and relationships, they can 
equally be used by criminals for the same 
purpose - to conceal their identity and/or 
the hosting location of websites, forums 
and markets, collectively referred to as 
“hidden services”.9
THE SALE OF DRUGS VIA PHOTO-
SHARING PLATFORMS
Photo-sharing applications and platforms 
are popular with a huge number of users. 
These services allow users to create 
communities around shared interests using 
hashtags. Drugs dealers and users make use 
of these platforms to form communities to 
discuss, exchange information and trade 
various types of illegal drugs. Potential 
customers scroll through pictures of 
advertised products and then contact the 
dealer privately using direct messaging 
functionalities. The eventual transaction 
takes place either face to face or via online 
payment and delivery by mail. 
As of January 2017, the TOR 
network had over 1.7 million 
directly connecting users, and 
hosted over 60,000 unique onion 
domains.7 In one study, almost 
57% of active sites could be 
classiﬁed as related to some 
form of illicit activity.8
Online platforms operating in the legal 
economy have had a profound impact on 
business models, shopping experiences and 
customer expectations. The multiplication 
of sales platforms makes online trade 
easier, more accessible and cheaper. This 
development has been mirrored in the 
online trade in illicit goods as criminals, like 
legitimate traders, look to opportunities 
online to grow their businesses. 
Virtually all illicit commodities are now 
traded online either on dedicated criminal 
online marketplaces or by exploiting 
otherwise legal online platforms. The 
number of goods on offer and frequency 
with which new products become available 
indicates that the online trade in illicit 
goods is thriving and highly dynamic. 
Commodities such as cannabis, cocaine, 
counterfeit currency, counterfeit medicine, 
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platforms use clients 
running on users devices to 
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STANDARD BROWSING
Surface web platforms 
selling illicit commodities 
are often easy to ﬁnd 
using simple internet 
searches, using a 
standard browser.
Illicit commodities, 
especially drugs and 
counterfeit goods, are 
increasingly advertised 
and sold on social media 
platforms.
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Vendors often attempts to hide 
illegal goods among legal 
products.
TOR BROWSING
The Darknet is a distributed 
anonymous network within 
the deep web that can only be 
accessed using software such 
as TOR, I2P and Freenet.
DARKNET ARMS VENDORS ARRESTED IN SLOVENIA 10 
Firearms traffickers use Darknet marketplaces to sell illegal firearms to private individuals, 
members of OCGs and terrorists based in the EU. In December 2016, Slovenian law 
enforcement authorities, with the support of Europol, arrested two suspects accused of 
selling various live firing weapons including automatic rifles, hand and smoke grenades as 
well as ammunition via a prominent Darknet marketplace. The firearms were paid for in 
Bitcoin.
5Jift to Dark markets
There is a shift from sales on the 
surface web to sales on the Darknet, 
typically when the status of a product 
or substance changes from being legal 
to illegal. For example, the sales of gun 
parts or de-activated firearms is legal 
in certain jurisdictions and therefore 
available on the surface web, but when 
the gun is assembled or re-activated it 
is illegal and will be sold on the Darknet. 
Likewise, a previously undiscovered 
New Psychoactive Substance (NPS) is 
initially unregulated and can be sold 
on the surface web, but as soon as it is 
regulated or restricted, sales will move 
to the Darknet. Dark markets are highly 
unstable. New decentralised markets 
are likely to overcome the weakness and 
vulnerability of being hosted in a specific 
location. These localised Dark markets cut 
out intermediaries, cater to sellers and 
buyers in their own language allowing 
them to interact directly. Transactions on 
local platforms enable sellers and buyers 
to avoid international mail systems by 
arranging the local collection of illegal 
goods. 
It is estimated that the top 1% most 
successful vendors are responsible 
for 51.5% of all transactions on Dark 
markets.11 Goods and services offered 
on the Darknet are available to anyone, 
be it an individual user, an OCG or 
terrorist group.12
Although the exact scale of the 
criminality on the Darknet cannot be 
fully determined as of yet, the Darknet 
is clearly an established criminal 
environment hosting an increasing 
number of platforms including Dark 
markets and other hidden services.
SURFACE WEB
DARKNET
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Drivers of crime shape the nature and 
impact of serious and organised crime 
activities.13 They include facilitating factors 
and vulnerabilities in society which create 
opportunities for criminals. 
6ecJnology
For almost all types of organised 
crime, criminals are deploying and 
adapting technology with ever 
greater skill and to ever greater 
effect. This is now, perhaps, the 
greatest challenge facing law 
enforcement authorities around the 
world, including in the EU.
e
Technological innovation continues to 
shape society and the economy, and 
by extension the serious and organised 
crime landscape in Europe. Criminal 
actors in the EU display a high degree of 
adaptability and creativity in exploiting 
and employing new technologies. While 
not all criminal activities are driven by 
technological developments, the internet 
and ever-increasing connectivity have an 
impact on virtually all types of serious and 
organised crime. Innovation in technology 
and logistics increasingly enable OCGs to 
commit crime anonymously, anywhere and 
anytime without being physically present. 
The Internet of Things is constantly 
expanding. Connectivity of all types of 
devices, including phones and appliances, 
is increasingly a reality in households and 
businesses across the EU. However, these 
devices remain vulnerable to intrusion and 
criminals are already deploying techniques 
to compromise these devices in order to 
gain personal and financial information and 
confidential data on business transactions.
)eoRolitical conteZt
The serious and organised crime landscape 
in the EU is fundamentally affected by 
the geopolitical situation in and around 
Europe. The impact of conflicts on the 
periphery of the EU, such as in Libya and 
Syria, on serious and organised crime 
in the EU has already materialised and 
will continue to influence crime. Armed 
conflicts and poverty are the most 
significant push factors for migrants 
travelling to the EU. The emergence of new 
conflicts or destabilisation of countries 
on the periphery of the EU would sustain 
the migration flow to the EU. Armed 
conflicts close to the EU also entail the 
risk of returning foreign fighters as well 
as the large-scale trafficking of firearms 
originating from these regions. 
DRIVERS OF CRIME
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.egal Dusiness structures
OCGs exploit various legal business 
structures and professional experts to 
maintain a facade of legitimacy, obscure 
criminal activities and profits, and to 
perpetrate lucrative and complex crimes. 
Legal business structures allow OCGs to 
operate in the legal economy and enable 
them to merge legal and illegal profits. 
-ey locations for crime
Key locations for crime feature well-developed transport 
and communication infrastructure. These locations 
are used to organise the global distribution of illicit 
commodities.
OCGs hide illicit goods among legal commodity flows, which are 
increasing in speed and volume and almost impossible to check 
thoroughly.  
Criminal groups will take advantage of weaknesses in new 
technologies, such as automated transport systems, and exploit gaps 
in the legal frameworks regulating them.
Key locations for crime are characterised by several different factors: 
the presence of efficient transport infrastructures, proximity to or 
connections with source countries and consumer markets, access to 
business and investment opportunities, as well as demand for illicit 
commodities or services.  
USING TECHNOLOGY TO FIGHT 
SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME
Technology is also a signiﬁcant aid 
to law enforcement authorities in the 
ﬁght against serious and organised 
crime. This includes the use of 
advanced digital forensics tools, the 
deployment of predictive policing 
software driven by Big Data as well as 
drones for the monitoring of areas and 
large events. 
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ASSESSING 
ORGANISED CRIME
The criminal markets and criminal activities detailed in 
this chapter are presented in alphabetical order.
CRIMINAL MARKETS 
AND SERVICES

The production of counterfeit currency requires varying degrees of 
sophistication depending on the currency and level of quality of the 
resulting counterfeits. Counterfeit banknotes of various currencies 
are traded online on surface web and Darknet marketplaces. 
Consequently, counterfeit currency is increasingly trafficked using 
parcel services.
While the production of counterfeit currency is currently not a 
major threat to the stability of the euro, the common European 
currency remains popular with counterfeiters. The most commonly 
counterfeited euro banknote denominations are the EUR20 and 
EUR50 notes.14  In 2016, the European Central Bank (ECB) decided 
to halt the production of EUR500 banknotes by the end of 2018 
in an effort to fight money laundering as well as the production of 
counterfeit euro banknotes. 
Cyber-dependent crimes are offences that can only be committed using a computer, 
computer networks or other form of information communications technology. Cybercrime 
is a global phenomenon affecting all Member States and is as borderless as the internet 
itself. The attack surface continues to grow as society becomes increasingly digitised, with 
more citizens, businesses, public services and devices connecting to the internet.
CURRENCY COUNTERFEITING
CYBERCRIME
A mature CaaS model underpins cybercrime, providing easy access to 
the tools and services required to carry out cyber-attacks. 
Cryptoware (ransomware using encryption) is a signiﬁcant threat to 
the EU, targeting not only citizens but increasingly public and private 
sector organisations alike.
Networks intrusions for the purpose of illegally acquiring data 
have signiﬁcant impact globally, resulting in the loss of intellectual 
property and the compromise of mass amounts of data which can be 
used for further criminality including fraud and extortion.
OPERATION AVALANCHE 15 
On 30 November 2016, after more than 
four years of investigation, the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office Verden and the Lüneburg 
Police (Germany) in close cooperation with 
the United States Attorney’s Office for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania, the 
Department of Justice and the FBI, Europol, 
Eurojust and global partners, dismantled an 
international criminal infrastructure platform 
known as ‘Avalanche’. The Avalanche network 
was used as a delivery platform to launch 
and manage mass global malware attacks 
and money mule recruiting campaigns. The 
monetary losses associated with malware 
attacks conducted over the Avalanche 
network are estimated to be in the hundreds 
of millions of euros worldwide, although 
exact calculations are difficult due to the 
high number of malware families managed 
through the platform. The global effort to 
take down this network involved the crucial 
support of prosecutors and investigators 
from 30 countries. The operation marks the 
largest-ever use of sinkholing to combat 
botnet infrastructures and is unprecedented 
in its scale, with over 800,000 domains seized, 
sinkholed or blocked.
C;$'4D'2'0D'06 C4+/'5
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of  internet users feel the 
risk to become a victim of 
cybercrime85%
Cryptoware
Cryptoware (ransomware using 
encryption) has become the 
leading malware in terms of 
threat and impact. It encrypts 
victimsŨ user generated ﬁles, 
denying them access unless the 
victim pays a fee to have their 
ﬁles decrypted.
Malware and ID theft
Malware typically steals user data 
such as credit card numbers, login 
credentials and personal 
information from infected 
machines for subsequent use by 
criminals in fraud.
 
Network attack
Network intrusions that result in 
unlawful access to or disclosure 
of private data  (data breaches) 
or intellectual property are 
growing in freSuency and scale, 
with hundreds of millions of 
records compromised globally 
each year.
Payment order fraud
Criminals use fraudulent transfer 
orders to defraud private and public 
sector organisations. Fraudsters 
heavily rely on social engineering 
techniques and malware to carry out 
this type of fraud. 
 
Payment card fraud 
Compromised card data is readily 
available and easy to obtain on 
forums, marketplaces and 
automated card shops in the 
deep web and Darknet. 
 
Online sexual exploitation
Child Sexual Exploitation 
Material is increasingly 
produced for ﬁnancial gain and 
distributed through the Darknet. 
Coercion and sexual extortion 
are increasingly being used to 
victimise children. 
 
The digital underground
The CaaS model provides easy access to tools and services 
across the entire spectrum of cyber-criminality, from 
entry-level to top-tier players, including those with other 
motivations such as hacktivists or even terrorists. This 
allows even entry-level cybercriminals to carry out attacks 
of a scale disproportionate to their technical capability. 
Criminal forums and marketplaces within the deep web or 
Darknet remain a crucial environment for cybercriminals to 
communicate and are a key component for CaaS.
CRIME-AS-A-SERVICE 
Cybercrime continues to grow as society 
becomes increasingly digitised
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/alYare
The development and distribution of 
malware continues to be the cornerstone 
for the majority of cybercrime. Information-
stealing malware, such as banking Trojans, 
still represent a significant threat. This 
type of malware typically steals user data 
such as credit card numbers and login 
credentials from infected machines for 
subsequent use by criminals in fraud.
Since late 2013, cryptoware (ransomware 
using encryption) has become the 
leading malware in terms of threat and 
impact. Cryptoware encrypts victims’ 
user generated files, denying them access 
unless the victim pays a fee to have their 
files decrypted. Following the trend of 
information stealers, cryptoware campaigns 
are increasingly targeting public and private 
sector entities.
0etYork attacks
Network attacks vary in modi operandi and 
purpose. Website defacement is a common 
but low-impact attack, and often the 
trademark of hacktivist groups targeting 
government or public websites.
Network intrusions that result in unlawful 
access to or disclosure of private data 
(data breaches) or intellectual property 
are growing in frequency and scale, 
with hundreds of millions of records 
compromised globally each year.16 
Compromised data can be used for a 
variety of criminal purposes including fraud 
and extortion17 and is highly valued by 
financially motivated criminals.18 
Some Member States highlight the 
particular threat posed by insiders to a 
company’s security. Any sector or network 
which holds data which can be monetised 
is a target for such attacks. 
Data has become a 
key commodity for 
criminals.
Increasing internet connectivity by 
citizens, businesses and the public 
sector, along with the exponentially 
growing number of connected devices 
and sensors as part of the Internet of 
Things will create new opportunities 
for cybercriminals. Malware targeting 
smart devices will lead to new 
sources of data leakage and network 
compromise and create new botnets. 
Given the ease of entry into cybercrime, 
the use of cyber tools and services by 
traditional OCGs to enhance or expand 
their capabilities is likely to become 
more commonplace.
Organised Crime 
Groups
Ransomware locks your computer 
and mobile devices or encrypts 
your electronic ﬁles, demanding a 
ransom payment in order to regain 
control of your data.
Ransomware can be 
obtained on the 
Darknet by OCGs
Means of infection
Compromised websites, 
fake mobile apps, email 
attachments
Ransom
Payment is almost 
exclusively in 
Bitcoins 
The proceedings 
can be used for 
any other criminal 
activity
Devices at risk
Computers and 
mobile devices
CRYPTOWARE
How it works
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While neither offline nor online CSE meet 
the criteria to be considered ‘organised 
crime’ this is still a high priority crime due 
to the degree of physical and psychological 
damage to one of society’s most vulnerable 
groups – children. 
Online and offline child sexual exploitation 
are often considered two different crime 
areas. However, a number of offenders are 
involved in both. There are indications that 
this is the case for about 30% of offenders 
in possession of CSEM.
The increasing global availability of 
broadband internet and internet-enabled 
devices continues to fuel the growing 
number of both offenders and victims in 
this area. While the same can be said of any 
number of crime areas, this phenomenon is 
a major contributor to online CSE.
The internet provides offenders and 
potential offenders with an environment in 
which they can operate with an enhanced 
level of safety and anonymity. In particular, 
there is a growing number of forums on 
the Darknet dedicated specifically to the 
production, sharing and distribution of 
CSEM. Typically this refers to services on 
the TOR network. Peer-to-peer (P2P) file 
sharing applications are the preferred 
method of exchanging CSEM. 
Commercial C5'/
Children are sexually exploited largely to 
satisfy the sexual appetites of those with a 
sexual interest in children. However, there 
is a growing trend in the production of 
CSEM for financial gain. A particular activity 
associated with commercial production of 
CSEM is that of Live Distant Child Abuse 
(LDCA). LDCA is a significant threat in 
this area of criminality. LDCA involves a 
perpetrator paying to direct the live abuse 
of children on a pre-arranged specific time-
frame through video sharing platforms. 
5elf)enerated +ndecent /aterial 
(5)+/)
There is a growing trend in the production 
of Self-Generated Indecent Material 
(SGIM) - typically teens or pre-teens taking 
indecent images of themselves to be 
shared privately with a partner or someone 
they believe they can trust, for example 
in grooming scenarios. Subsequently, 
these images can be distributed either 
accidentally or maliciously without the 
owner’s consent. 
5eZual eZtortion
Often associated with the production of 
SGIM is the growing practice of sexual 
extortion, whereby an offender uses 
an explicit image of a minor - obtained 
incidentally or through coercion or 
deception - to further coerce or extort the 
child into either producing more material 
or engaging in further online or even offline 
abuse. In some cases the perpetrator 
alternatively seeks financial gain.19
O0.+0' C*+.D 5':7#. ':2.O+6#6+O0 (C5')
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Child Sexual Exploitation 
Material (CSEM) is increasingly 
produced for ﬁnancial gain.
A growing number of Darknet 
forums facilitating the exchange 
of CSEM, coupled with the ease 
of access to these networks, 
is leading to an increase in the 
volume of material exchanged 
through the Darknet.
Coercion and sexual extortion 
are increasingly being used to 
victimise children. Offenders use 
these methods to obtain further 
child abuse material, for ﬁnancial 
gain or to get physical access to 
the victim.
Some OCGs have 
partly industrialised 
their processes, using 
workshops to produce 
counterfeit cards.
Payment card fraud is a low-risk, high-profit 
activity. Compromised card data is readily 
available and easy to obtain on forums, 
marketplaces and automated card shops in 
the deep web and Darknet. Payment card 
fraud can be split into two distinct crime 
areas: Card-present fraud and card-not-
present fraud.
CardRresent fraud (C2)
CP fraud requires an offender to present 
a physical card at an automated teller 
machine (ATM), Point of Sale (POS) or 
other terminal. This crime has two stages: 
obtaining a card, and the use of the card. 
The cards used are either lost or stolen 
genuine cards, or counterfeit cards. Unlike 
fraud using lost or stolen cards, fraud using 
counterfeit cards is typically committed 
outside the Single Euro Payments Area 
(SEPA). 
CardnotRresent fraud (C02)
CNP fraud involves the use card data to 
make fraudulent purchases online or 
by telephone. Unlike CP fraud, the data 
required is only that needed to make an 
online credit card purchase – the name 
of the card holder, billing address, card 
number, expiry date and security code. The 
fraud, commonly referred to as ‘carding’, 
is committed across all sectors but the 
purchases of physical goods, airline tickets, 
car rentals and accommodation with 
compromised cards have generally seen an 
increase throughout the EU. Where CNP is 
used to fraudulently purchase goods, like 
CP fraud, offenders will typically purchase 
high-value goods with the intention of 
reselling them. Offenders will often use 
packet mules or reshipping services to 
safely receive their fraudulently obtained 
goods. 
CNP is fuelled by the availability of 
compromised card data resulting from 
PAYMENT CARD FRAUD
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL NETWORK 
BEHIND LARGE-SCALE PAYMENT 
FRAUD DISMANTLED20
In September 2016, Italian and Romanian 
law enforcement authorities supported 
by Europol disrupted an international 
criminal group responsible for large-scale 
misuse of compromised payment card data, 
prostitution and money laundering. The 
criminal network used sophisticated ATM 
skimming devices which allowed them to 
compromise ATMs and deceptive phishing 
techniques to perform a high volume of 
fraudulent transactions. Estimated losses 
incurred by the criminals’ activities amount 
to several hundred thousands of euros. 
Micro-camera bars, card readers, magnetic 
strip readers and writers, computers, 
phones and flash drives, several vehicles, 
as well as thousands of plastic cards ready 
to be encoded were seized in several 
locations.
Some OCGs run ‘laboratories’ 
to study ATMs in order to 
conduct targeted attacks.
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data breaches, information stealing 
malware and phishing. As many data 
breaches often involve the compromise of 
millions of card details at once, there is a 
considerable excess of card data compared 
to the demand. Among the places where 
compromised card data can be found are 
an increasing number of illegal carding sites 
on both the deep web and Darknet where 
not only card data can be purchased but 
offenders can learn about how and where 
to ‘card’. New payments methods provide 
offenders with new opportunities to use 
compromised card data. By uploading 
the card data to smartphone services, 
offenders can make “in app” or “on site” 
payments to apps which they control. 
The growing e-commerce industry 
will result in a parallel growth of CNP 
fraud, especially as industry measures 
at preventing CP fraud become more 
effective. Criminal modus operandi will be 
shaped by industry measures to counter 
payment card fraud. 
Emerging and alternate payment options 
such as contactless payment using Near 
Field Communication (NFC) will drive 
innovation within OCGs to enable them to 
abuse new technologies. New electronic/
card-less payment methods may however 
ultimately result in a downwards trend card 
fraud.
GLOBAL ACTION AGAINST AIRLINE 
FRAUDSTERS21
Global Airport Action Days combine the 
efforts of law enforcement and private 
sector partners to combat the fraudulent 
online purchases of flight tickets, which 
is estimated to cost the industry over 
EUR 1 billion per year. Fraudulent online 
transactions are highly lucrative for 
organised crime and are often purchased 
to facilitate more serious criminal activities 
including migrant smuggling, THB, drug 
trafficking and terrorism. In October 2016, 
the fifth Global Airport Action Day was 
organised through coordination centres 
at Europol, INTERPOL Global Complex for 
Innovation in Singapore and Ameripol 
in Bogota. The activity was supported 
by Canadian and US law enforcement 
agencies. Representatives from airlines, 
online travel agencies, payment card 
companies, Perseuss and the International 
Air Transport Association (IATA) worked 
together with law enforcement officers 
deployed in the airports. Eurojust assisted 
throughout the action week, together with 
the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency (Frontex) which deployed officers 
to 20 airports, assisting in the detection of 
identity fraud, fake documents and migrant 
smuggling. 193 individuals suspected of 
traveling with airline tickets bought using 
stolen, compromised or fake credit card 
details were detained. 43 countries, 75 
airlines and 8 online travel agencies were 
involved in this global operation which took 
place at 189 airports across the world.
ID THEFT AND 
PAYMENT CARD 
FRAUD
STEP 1
A fraudster uses malware and 
social engineering to access 
your computer
STEP 2
Your login credentials,
bank account details,
credit card numbers and
other personal information 
are stolen
STEP 3
Your data is sold on 
the Darknet
STEP 4
OGCs use your compromised 
ID and ﬁnancial data to 
support their criminal 
activities
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Drug markets remain the largest criminal 
markets in the EU. More than one third 
of the criminal groups active in the EU 
are involved in the production, trafficking 
or distribution of various types of drugs. 
The trade in drugs generates multi-billion 
euro profits for the groups involved in this 
criminal activity. The EU retail drug market 
is estimated to be worth at least EUR 
24 billion a year.22  The immense profits 
generated from the trade in drugs fund 
various other criminal activities allowing 
OCGs to thrive and develop their criminal 
enterprises at the expense of the health, 
prosperity and security of EU citizens.
OCGs involved in drug trafficking heavily 
rely on corruption to facilitate their 
trafficking activities. They also make use 
of fraudulent documents such as fake 
import or company registration certificates 
to import illicit drugs among legal goods, 
to procure pre-precursors and purchase 
equipment used as part of production 
processes.
Online trade
Criminals continuously seek out methods 
and technologies to make their business 
models more effective and increase profit 
margins. Online marketplaces on the 
Darknet are now a key platform used to 
advertise and sell all types of drugs. The 
anonymous nature of online transactions 
on these marketplaces and the use of 
cryptocurrencies reduce the risks of 
detection by law enforcement authorities 
for both vendors and buyers. 
Technology
Technical innovation and the accessibility 
of sophisticated equipment have allowed 
OCGs to maximise the production output 
of individual sites. Large-scale cannabis 
cultivation sites are often maintained 
using professional growing equipment 
such as climate control systems, CO2 and 
ozone generators. Similarly, laboratories 
manufacturing synthetic drugs feature 
advanced chemical equipment and 
production lines capable of producing 
synthetic drugs on an industrial scale.  
Drone technology is expected to advance 
allowing drones to travel greater distances 
and carry heavier loads as well as making 
them more affordable. OCGs involved in 
drug trafficking will likely invest in drone 
technology for trafficking purposes in order 
to avoid checks at border crossing points, 
ports and airports. 
DRUG PRODUCTION, TRAFFICKING 
AND DISTRIBUTION
419 
EUR
billion/year 
in profits
previously undetected N2S 
reported in the E7 for the first 
time over the past five years
of the criminal groups 
active in the E7 are 
involved in the drug 
market
Drug market generates
TRENDS
ONLINE TRADE 
Online marketplaces on the 
Darknet are noY a key 
platform used to advertise 
and sell all types of drugs.
SYNTHETIC DRUGS 
The market for synthetic drugs 
continues to be the most 
dynamic of the drug markets in 
the E7.
CUTTING - EDGE 
TECHNOLOGY
Technical innovation and 
sophisticated eSuipment 
alloY OCGs to maZimise the 
production output.
TOXIC WASTE
The production of synthetic drugs 
generates large Suantities of highly 
toZic and dangerous Yaste. Dump 
sites often remain contaminated 
for a significant period of time and 
their recovery is costly.
LIBYA
.ibya is emerging as a neY 
distribution hub for cannabis 
resin trafficked to the E7 across 
the Mediterranean Sea.
>75%
of the OCGs involved in the trafficking of 
one drug also traffic and distribute other 
types of drugs.
  
~65%
of OCGs involved in the drug trade are 
simultaneously involved in other criminal 
activities such as the trade in counterfeit 
goods, THB and migrant smuggling. Drugs 
are also used as a means of payment 
among criminal groups.
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Cannabis remains, by far, the most widely 
consumed illegal drug in the EU.23 Cannabis 
is distributed on EU markets as cannabis 
resin and herbal cannabis. In recent years, 
herbal cannabis has been increasingly 
popular with consumers, which has led 
to an increase in the production and 
availability of herbal cannabis within the EU 
and in countries close to EU markets.
Growing equipment, seeds and other raw 
materials used for cannabis cultivation 
in the EU are readily available online and 
often originate from the Netherlands. The 
indoor cultivation of herbal cannabis in the 
EU is expected to further expand over the 
coming years with new growing techniques 
and increasingly sophisticated growing 
technologies being used by OCGs in order 
to increase harvest yields and profits. 
Outdoor cultivation of herbal cannabis 
remains limited compared to the indoor 
cultivation of cannabis. 
Albania remains the main source of herbal 
cannabis trafficked to the EU. The main 
source of cannabis resin consumed in the 
EU is Morocco from where it is trafficked to 
the EU primarily by sea and road transport. 
Cannabis resin originating from Morocco is 
increasingly smuggled to the EU across the 
Mediterranean Sea departing from Libya. 
Cannabis resin shipments are transported 
across the Mediterranean Sea to the 
Spanish coast using high-powered vessels 
where they are dropped into the sea and 
retrieved by OCGs on local fishing vessels 
or pleasure boats using GPS signalling 
devices. 
CANNABIS
‘ROSE OF THE WINDS’  – 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATION AGAINST 
DRUG TRAFFICKING 24
In December 2016, a multinational police 
team including Europol announced the 
arrest of a major Moroccan drug kingpin. 
The work that led to this arrest began in 
April 2016. The Moroccan national had 
orchestrated a multi-tonne drug delivery. 
This is the latest successful result achieved 
by JOT ’Rose of the Winds’. Approximately 
one week prior to his apprehension, 
the Spanish Guardia Civil, supported by 
Europol, the French Direction Nationale 
du Renseignement et des Enquêtes 
Douanières and the Italian Guardia di 
Finanza, localised and intercepted a 
merchant vessel flying the flag of Panama. 
The ship was subsequently escorted to the 
port of Almeria, where a thorough search 
revealed the illegal cargo of 19.6 tonnes of 
cannabis resin. The crew were arrested and 
the shipment was seized. The investigations 
also revealed a poly-crime involvement of 
the transnational organised crime networks 
active in large-scale drug trafficking in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Namely, concrete and 
recurrent links with migrant smuggling and 
cocaine trafficking have been ascertained. 
The market for cannabis 
remains by far the 
largest drug market in 
the EU.
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ALBANIA
Main source
CZECH REP.
Distribution hub
NETHERLANDS
Main distribution hub
CANNABIS HERB
2roduction, trafﬁcking and 
distribution
CANNABIS 
/eans of transportation Trafﬁcking to E7
Trafﬁcking within E7
CANNABIS RESIN
Cannabis resin continues to be 
trafﬁcked in large Suantities 
from Morocco to the E7. 
Libya is emerging as a new 
distribution hub for cannabis 
resin trafﬁcked to the E7 across 
the /editerranean Sea. 
The indoor cultivation of 
herbal cannabis in the E7 is 
expected to further expand 
over the coming years with 
new growing techniSues and 
increasingly sophisticated 
growing technologies being 
used by OC)s. 
PLEASURE BOAT SPEED BOAT
BUSPRIVATE CAR
CONTAINERCOURIER LORRY
LORRY
SMALL AIRCRAFT
SMALL AIRCRAFTCOURIER
MOROCCO
Main source
AFGHANISTAN
Main sourceALBANIA
Distribution hub
LIBYA
Distribution hub
NETHERLANDS
Distribution hub
SPAIN
Distribution hub
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Cocaine is primarily produced in Colombia, 
Peru and Bolivia and trafficked to the EU 
via other South American countries such as 
Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, the Caribbean 
Sea region and West Africa. Over the last 
two years, the production of cocaine in 
Colombia has intensified significantly. 
An increase in the production output in 
Colombia will likely impact on the EU in 
the form of intensified trafficking activity 
as well as greater availability of cocaine on 
drug markets in the Member States.
The trafficking modi operandi associated 
with the trade in cocaine have largely 
remained the same. Cocaine is typically 
trafficked as part of large shipments in 
containers or in smaller quantities by 
couriers.
Large shipments of cocaine are trafficked in 
containers hidden among legal goods or as 
part of the rip-on/rip-off modus operandi.  
Brazil is a key point of departure for 
cocaine couriers travelling directly to the 
EU. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and 
destinations in East Africa have emerged 
as hubs for cocaine couriers travelling to 
the EU. Cruise ships departing from the 
Caribbean Sea region are increasingly being 
used to traffic cocaine to the EU.
COCAINE
More OCGs are involved 
in cocaine trafﬁcking 
than any other criminal 
activity in the EU.
OPERATION FULECO 
Brazil is among the main countries of 
departure for couriers trafficking cocaine 
to the EU. This has been confirmed by 
the results of Operation Fuleco, an effort 
by Member States supported by Europol 
targeting cocaine couriers arriving to the 
EU’s major airports. During Operation 
Fuleco, nearly 200 cocaine couriers were 
arrested and almost 500 kilograms of 
cocaine seized in the Netherlands, Spain, 
Portugal, the United Kingdom, France, 
Belgium, Germany and Ireland. Operation 
Fuleco took place in June and July 2014 
and involved 12 Member States including 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom.
COCAINE
2roduction, trafﬁcking and 
distribution
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
SPAIN
COLOMBIA
PERU
BOLIVIA
PROFITS
5.7 
BILLION EUR / YEAR
Signiﬁcant increase in 
production in Colombia may 
result in intensiﬁed trafﬁcking 
activity to the E7. 
Means of 
transportation
Trafﬁcking to E7
Trafﬁcking within E7
PLEASURE BOAT CONTAINER
CONTAINER
COURIER
LORRY SMALL AIRCRAFTPARCEL 
Main producers
Main entry points in the EU
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Afghanistan remains the leading producer 
of heroin trafficked to the EU. The 
production output of opium and heroin in 
Afghanistan is very high and is projected to 
remain so for the foreseeable future. 
Production of heroin remains rare in 
the EU. However, depending on the 
development of the demand for heroin and 
potential disruptions to trafficking activities 
from Afghanistan further laboratories may 
emerge in the EU in the future. Heroin 
is also available on online marketplaces 
and is occasionally distributed across the 
EU in small quantities via post and parcel 
services.
HEROIN
HEROIN
2roFuction trafficking anF 
distribution
Partial shift for the 
trafficking of heroin 
froO the $aNkan route 
to the Caucasus route AFGHANISTAN
Main producer
PAKISTAN
Main producer
BALKAN ROUTE
SOUTHERN ROUTE
NORTHERN ROUTE
CAUCASUS ROUTE
6rafficking to '7
6rafficking Yithin '7
Means of transportation
$7524+8#6' %#4 LORRY%174+'42#4%'. 
$7524+8#6' %#4
%106#+0'4 5/#.. $1#6 ('44;
LORRY%174+'42#4%'. 
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The Balkan route 
remains the main entry 
route for the trafficking 
of heroin into the EU.
The production of different types of 
synthetic drugs takes place in various 
Member States. The intended destination 
markets for synthetic drugs produced in 
the EU vary according to the substance and 
production location. A share of the large-
scale production of 3,4-methylenedioxy-
methamphetamine (MDMA), amphetamine 
and, to a lesser extent, methamphetamine 
in the Netherlands and Belgium is intended 
for trafficking to markets outside the EU, 
while the production of synthetic drugs 
in other parts of the EU predominantly 
supplies domestic and neighbouring EU 
markets.
The Netherlands and Belgium remain 
a globally significant production 
and distribution hub for MDMA and 
amphetamine. The OCGs involved in the 
production of synthetic drugs are highly 
flexible and have significant financial 
resources to constantly explore new 
market opportunities such as engaging in 
the production of other synthetic drugs 
including mephedrone.
Production sites for methamphetamine are 
expected to also appear in other Member 
States in greater numbers in the future, 
especially those with existing production 
capabilities for amphetamine.
SYNTHETIC DRUGS AND NEW PSYCHOACTIVE 
SUBSTANCES (NPS)
Main producers
Methamphetamine
Amphetamine
MDMA
Export / Main destinations
CZECH 
REP.
SLOVAKIA
POLAND
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
to UNITED STATES to AUSTRALIA
Trafﬁcking to EU Trafﬁcking within EU
Means of transportation
PRIVATE CAR LORRYPARCEL CONTAINERCOURIER AIR
FREIGHT
PARCEL 
SYNTHETIC DRUGS AND 
NEW PSYCHOACTIVE 
SUBSTANCES
Production, trafﬁcking and 
distribution
The market for synthetic 
drugs continues to be the 
most dynamic of the drug 
markets in the EU.
The production capacity 
of synthetic drug 
laboratories has increased 
signiﬁcantly in recent 
years. 
Over the last ﬁve years, 
419 new NPS were 
detected in the EU for the 
ﬁrst time.
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2recursors and RreRrecursors
OCGs producing synthetic drugs in the 
EU continue to be highly flexible and 
will remain so in the future. They are 
quick to adopt alternative precursor and 
pre-precursor substances in reaction to 
any shortages in established precursor 
substances. China remains a major 
supplier of pre-precursor substances and 
essential chemicals as well as hardware and 
glassware for synthetic drug laboratories in 
the EU.
Some OCGs have specialised in the 
procurement and production of pre-
precursor and precursor substances 
supplying OCGs producing and distributing 
synthetic drugs in the EU.
NPS
NPS continue to be produced in China and, 
to a lesser degree, India and trafficked to 
the EU in large quantities. NPS production 
in the EU is largely limited to packaging and 
re-selling of imported substances. However, 
some limited NPS production is thought to 
take place in the EU.
OPERATION ALIMAYA
In March 2016, Spanish law enforcement 
authorities in cooperation with other 
Member States and supported by Europol 
were able to dismantle a network 
importing and distributing large quantities 
of dangerous NPS in the EU. This network 
used various companies to import and 
sell these substances, especially synthetic 
cannabinoids from China, generating 
significant profits. Coordinated action in 
March 2016 involving house searches at 
four locations resulted in the seizure of 
550 litres of acetone, 75,000 envelopes 
used for packaging different NPS brands, 
NPS worth more than EUR 1.5 million. This 
investigation highlights the profits involved 
in the distribution of NPS.
CONTAINER SEIZURE OF 2.8 TONNES 
OF MDMA AND METHAMPHETAMINE 
VALUED MORE THAN USD 1.5 
BILLION25
In November 2014, Australian law 
enforcement authorities seized a 
maritime shipping container holding 
approximately 2.8 tonnes of MDMA 
and methamphetamine. The load was 
estimated to have a street value of more 
than EUR 1.4 billion (USD 1.5 billion). 
At the time, the value and size of the 
seizure was unprecedented. The container 
arrived in Australia from Europe and was 
seized following an intelligence operation. 
The seizure led to the arrest of several 
individuals in Australia and Australian 
law enforcement authorities suspect 
the involvement of several OCGs in the 
production, trafficking and intended 
distribution of this shipment. This seizure 
highlights the scope of the trafficking of 
synthetic drugs from the EU to destination 
markets around the world.
CHILDREN BURNT BY DUMPED 
WASTE FROM SYNTHETIC DRUGS 
PRODUCTION
In August 2015, four children and 
accompanying adult suffered severe burns 
to their legs after coming in contact with 
chemical waste dumped by suspected 
synthetic drug producers in Belgium. 
Some of the waste produced as part of the 
manufacture of synthetic drugs is highly 
dangerous. Drug producers frequently 
dump this type of waste away from their 
laboratories in order to disguise their 
locations. 
The great quantities of MDMA and 
amphetamine produced by Dutch OCGs are 
not solely intended for distribution in the 
EU. The MDMA and amphetamine output 
from production in the Netherlands and 
Belgium is trafficked to destination markets 
around the world. Australia remains 
among the most significant destination 
markets outside the EU for synthetic drugs 
produced in the Netherlands and Belgium. 
In some cases, large shipments of synthetic 
drugs are trafficked to destinations outside 
the EU in maritime shipping containers. 
There has been a significant increase in 
the amount of MDMA trafficked from the 
Netherlands to the United States over the 
last two years.
The production of synthetic drugs 
generates large quantities of highly toxic 
waste. OCGs dump this waste away 
from production laboratories to conceal 
their location. Dump sites often remain 
contaminated for a significant period 
of time and their recovery is costly. The 
dumping of toxic waste in public places 
also entails significant risks for the health 
and safety of citizens. In recent years, the 
number of dump sites discovered in the EU 
has been increasing. Dump sites are most 
frequently discovered in the Netherlands 
and Belgium.
There is a growing market for illegal 
hormonal substances in the EU. These 
substances are both trafficked to and 
illegally produced in the EU. 
Hormonal substances trafficked to the EU 
typically originate from China, India and 
Thailand. However, over the last few years 
production facilities for illicit hormonal 
substances have also been discovered in 
the EU. 
HORMONAL 
SUBSTANCES
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ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
IVORY TRAFFICKING
In November 2016, Austrian law 
enforcement authorities seized 560 
kilograms of trafficked ivory, the 
equivalent of 590 elephant tusks. Ivory 
is worth more than EUR 1,000 (USD 
1,000) per kilogram on the Austrian 
black market. German law enforcement 
authorities seized 1,200 kilograms of 
ivory at a Berlin airport, Germany, in 
May 2016. Raw and manufactured 
ivory were falsely declared and 
destined for Vietnam.
Environmental crime covers a diverse 
range of different offences including the 
improper collection, transport, recovery 
or disposal of waste, the illegal operation 
of a plant in which a dangerous activity 
is carried out or in which dangerous 
substances or preparations are stored, the 
killing, destruction, possession or trade of 
specimens of protected wild fauna or flora 
species, and the production, importation, 
exportation, placing on the market or use 
of ozone-depleting substances.
Environmental crime is characterised by its 
impact on the natural environment. The 
environmental impact manifests itself in 
increasing levels of pollution, a degradation 
of wildlife, a reduction in biodiversity and 
the disturbance of ecological balance.  
Environmental crime puts public health at 
risk.
ILLICIT WASTE 
TRAFFICKING
The use of legal business structures for 
illicit waste trafficking activities by criminal 
actors are an inherent feature of this crime 
area. In many cases, criminal actors and 
legal businesses are indistinguishable from 
one another. As part of this development, 
criminals involved in illicit waste trafficking 
have moved towards the more complex 
business model of illicit waste management 
rather than just illegally dumping waste. 
Illicit waste traffickers now operate along 
the entire waste processing chain, heavily 
relying on the use of legal business 
structures for their activities.
The trafficking of illicit waste typically 
involves the use of fraudulent documents.
TRAFFICKING OF 
ENDANGERED 
SPECIES
The trafficking of and trade in endangered 
species involves the collection or 
processing of animals and plants protected 
by national and international regulations. 
The Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES) provides the international 
framework for the protection of 
endangered species and aims to ensure 
that international trade in specimens of 
wild animals and plants does not threaten 
their survival. 
The EU is primarily a transit region 
for endangered species trafficked to 
destination markets in Asia and North 
America. The most commonly trafficked 
species and wildlife products trafficked 
from, to and via the EU include glass 
eels, reptiles, exotic birds, pangolin, fish, 
narwhal meat, shells, corals, date mussels, 
timber and ivory. 
The number of OCGs involved in the 
trafficking of and trade in endangered 
species is low, but believed to be 
increasing. The OCGs involved are highly 
specialised and typically only focus on this 
specific activity. 
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FRAUD
Alcohol, cigarettes and mineral oils are 
subject to excise duty upon production in, 
or on import to, the EU. OCGs use various 
modi operandi to avoid excise duties and 
generate significant profits selling both 
genuine and counterfeit excise goods at 
lower prices than their licit equivalents. 
Excise tax fraud is driven by legislative 
differences and varying excise tax rates 
applied by different jurisdictions.  
EXCISE FRAUD
INVESTMENT FRAUD
Excise goods are increasingly offered 
and bought online.
UNDERSTANDING EXCISE FRAUD
ABUSE OF DUTY SUSPENSION SCHEMES
FUEL FRAUD
Fuel fraud is a growing phenomenon 
and typically involves base-oil fraud, 
also called ‘designer fuel’ fraud and fuel 
laundering. This type of fraud requires 
significant expertise, which is usually only 
available from trained chemists or similar 
professions.
Investment fraud schemes generate 
huge proﬁts. One investigation 
revealed estimated proﬁts of up to 
EUR 3 billion generated by one OCG.
What is social engineering? 
Social engineering techniques are a key 
element to many different types of fraud. 
Social engineering is the use of deception 
to manipulate individuals into divulging 
confidential or personal information that may 
be used for fraudulent purposes.
OPERATION BATEO
In 2015, law enforcement authorities in 
the EU launched an investigation into an 
OCG with ties to Germany, Portugal and 
Spain. This OCG operated a sophisticated 
pyramid fraud scheme offering investments 
into a music sharing platform and other 
online services. The OCG used various front 
companies. The investigation was able to 
identify more than 50,000 victims in 34 
countries. Overall, the OCG was able to 
generate an estimated profit of more than 
EUR 3 billion.
Successful investment fraud schemes 
typically use various social engineering 
techniques to operate. Fraud schemes 
relying on social engineering are 
particularly hard to counter.
The abuse of duty suspension schemes 
are the main modi operandi used to 
avoid the payment of excise duties on 
alcohol products and are also increasingly 
used to avoid excise duties on tobacco 
products. These modi operandi involve 
the exploitation of the EU Excise 
Movement Control System (EMCS), a 
computerised system registering the 
movement of excise goods within the EU, 
and the T1 procedure, which is applied 
for excise goods under suspension 
schemes imported from outside the EU, 
by falsely declaring the real destination 
and quantities of excise goods imported 
into the EU.
How does it work?
In relation to alcohol products, as part 
of the import process for the EMCS and 
the T1 procedure, criminals declare a 
Member State which applies low excise 
rates as the intended destination of the 
trafficked goods. Accomplices in the 
declared country of destination, such as 
corrupt warehouse employees, confirm 
receipt of the goods. However, in reality 
the goods are exported to countries 
applying high excise rates. The goods 
appear legitimate as documents certify 
that any excise obligations due were paid. 
If the product originates from a country 
applying high excise rates, the goods 
often do not leave the country at all and 
the movement of the goods is purely 
virtual.    
In other cases, traffickers file an 
application for the transfer of one load 
and use a duplicate of the transport 
authorisation to import multiple loads 
without paying excise duties.
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Mass marketing fraud schemes rely on 
mass-communication media, including 
telephones, the internet, mass mailing, 
television and radio, to contact victims and 
solicit money or other items of value in one 
or more jurisdictions.
Between May 2014 and May 2015, a UK-
based OCG defrauded over EUR 690,000 
(GBP 600,000) from pensioners across 
the country. Posing as police officers, OCG 
members contacted victims by phone to 
warn them of the risk of fraud involving 
their bank. The victims were encouraged 
to transfer their savings to safekeeping 
accounts controlled by the fraudsters.26 
Fraudsters already rely on social media 
and instant messaging applications to 
obtain sensitive information or elicit 
payments from their victims. 
Scams relying on phishing or cold-
calling can target thousands of victims 
at once. In one cold-calling case, one 
telecommunications provider was 
confronted with 3.6 million attempts 
against 90,000 victims.
MASS MARKETING FRAUD
UNDERSTANDING INVESTMENT FRAUD
Criminals orchestrate various investment fraud schemes. The most common schemes 
encountered in the EU include:
SECURITY 
BREACH 
SCAMS
Fraudster calls posing as an IT 
specialist from the employee’s 
company (or as a bank employee)
Informs of a security breach on 
the company’s system (or on the 
internet banking facility) 
OPTION 1: Requires 
ﬁnancial details 
necessary for check-up  
and/or downloading of a 
remote access software
The data/access obtained is 
used to transfer funds from the 
company’s account to the 
fraudster’s account
OPTION 2: Encourages the employee to contact the 
bank. Uses technology to remain on the line after 
termination of the call and therefore obtain sensitive 
ﬁnancial details disclosed to the bank employee 
(account numbers; access codes)
STEP 1
STEP 2
STEP 3
STEP 4
•Encourages transfer of 
funds to a “safe-keeping 
account”   
•The employee transfers 
funds to an account 
controlled by the fraudster 
The money is re-trans-
ferred to accounts in 
multiple jurisdictions
ALTERNATIVE
Fraudsters operating Boiler room 
schemes use cold-calling to contact 
their victims and pressure them into 
investing in non-existent or very low-
value stocks. Fraudsters often use false 
documents and certificates to present 
their company and the offered stock as 
legitimate. 
As part of Ponzi schemes, fraudsters 
attract a group of initial investors with 
promises of very high returns in a very 
short time. The fraudster starts to repay 
the initial investors to attract more victims 
using funds accrued from additional 
investors. In reality, the money is not 
invested and the fraudsters ultimately 
disappear with the funds. The money is 
laundered through multiple bank accounts 
held by various front companies in 
different jurisdictions. 
Pyramid schemes operate on the same 
model as Ponzi schemes. However, the 
initial investors are actively involved and 
are required to recruit new investors in 
order to get profits.
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Criminals use fraudulent 
transfer orders to defraud 
private and public sector 
organisations. Typically, the 
affected organisations are active 
internationally. This increasingly 
common type of fraud is also 
referred to as CEO fraud, wire 
transfer fraud or business e-mail 
compromise. Fraudsters heavily 
rely on social engineering 
techniques and malware to carry 
out this type of fraud. OCGs 
organising CEO fraud schemes 
targeting organisations based 
in the EU typically operate 
remotely from outside the EU.
Typically, stolen funds are 
transferred through series of 
accounts in various Member 
States before reaching 
destination accounts outside 
the EU.
VAT frauds are highly complex forms of 
tax fraud relying on the abuse of the VAT 
rules for cross-border transactions. VAT 
fraudsters generate multi-billion euro 
profits by avoiding the payment of VAT 
or by fraudulently claiming repayments 
of VAT by national authorities following a 
chain of transactions. The most common 
form of VAT fraud is Missing Trader Intra-
Community (MTIC) fraud. 
Changes in commodity prices have an 
impact on the profitability of MTIC fraud 
schemes involving specific commodities or 
services. This is particularly true for fraud 
schemes involving the energy sector and 
related commodities, which are subject to 
frequent price fluctuations. 
PAYMENT ORDER FRAUD
8#.7' #DD'D 6#: (8#6) (4#7D
A fraudster calls posing  as a 
high-ranking ﬁgure of the 
company 
Requires an urgent transfer 
of funds and absolute 
conﬁdentiality
Invokes a sensitive 
situation (e.g. tax control; 
merger; acquisition)
Pressures the employee not to follow 
the regular authorisation procedures 
Instructions on how to 
proceed are given later by a 
third-person or via e-mail 
The employee transfers funds 
to an account controlled by 
the fraudster. The money is 
re-transferred to accounts in 
multiple jurisdictions CEO
 IMPERSONATION
•Requests to receive information on clients 
(e.g. all unsettled invoices)
•Uses the information obtained to defraud 
clients 
ALTERNATIVE
STEP 1
STEP 2
STEP 3
STEP 4
STEP 5
STEP 6
UNDERSTANDING FRAUDULENT 
TRANSFER ORDERS
UNDERSTANDING VAT FRAUD
MTIC FRAUD
Cross-border transactions within the EU are zero-rated, which 
means that the payment of the VAT is not due until the goods are 
sold at their destination. This enables traders to import goods 
without accounting right away for the VAT. In simple MTIC cases, 
fraudsters sell the goods, charge the VAT to buyers without 
remitting the value to the tax authorities. 
More complex cases of VAT fraud are typically known as carousel 
frauds. As part of these fraud schemes goods are imported and 
sold through a series of companies before being exported again. 
The exporters of these goods claim and receive the reimbursement 
of VAT payments that never occurred.  
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+nsurance fraud 
Fraudsters defraud hundreds of millions 
of euros from private and public 
insurance providers each year. OCGs are 
increasingly involved in fraud schemes 
targeting health care systems. 
In 2015, German law enforcement 
authorities dismantled a Russian-
speaking OCG providing nursing services 
in order to defraud health care insurance 
providers.
OTHER TYPES OF FRAUD
2rocurement rigging
Procurement procedures are frequently 
the target of corruption. Criminal groups 
use bribes to elicit information or 
directly influence the evaluation of bids 
in order to win public service tenders 
in competition with legal businesses. 
This type of manipulation is particularly 
notable in the energy, construction, 
information technology and waste 
management sectors. 
.oan and mortgage fraud 
Fraudsters organising loan or credit 
fraud schemes typically rely on 
fraudulent documents to obtain bank 
loans, which are never paid back.  
$eneﬁt fraud
Benefit fraud schemes cause significant 
financial losses for all Member States. 
OCGs and individual fraudsters target 
social and labour benefit schemes to 
defraud the state of regular benefit 
payments. Benefit fraud is strongly 
linked to THB and migrant smuggling. 
'7 suDsidy fraud 
OCGs have repeatedly attempted 
to defraud EU funds by submitting 
applications for EU grants or tenders. 
Typically, these applications are based 
on false declarations such as fraudulent 
progress reports as well as fraudulent 
documents such as fake invoices. 
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POLY-CRIMINAL OCG INVOLVED IN 
THE TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS 
AND DRUG TRAFFICKING
In 2015 and 2016, Europol supported an 
operation targeting an Italian OCG selling 
counterfeit champagne in various Member 
States. Investigations in Italy and Germany 
revealed that some of the suspects 
were also involved in the trafficking 
of cocaine. During house searches in 
Germany, investigators seized more than 
12,000 bottles of fake champagne. The 
investigation also uncovered links to VAT 
and excise fraud.
In 2015, more than 80,000 seizures were 
registered by customs authorities in the 
EU. These shipments contained more than 
40 million articles worth an estimated EUR 
642 million. Cigarettes remain the most 
frequently seized counterfeit product 
accounting for 27% of all seizures, followed 
by other goods such as batteries or air 
fresheners at 10% as well as toys at 9%. 
Regular household items such as body 
care articles, medicines, toys, electrical 
household goods represent 25.8% of 
the total number of seized counterfeit 
products. 
The infringement of intellectual property 
rights is a widespread phenomenon 
in the EU. Cheap counterfeit copies of 
popular goods remain highly popular with 
consumers. Criminals are able to produce 
counterfeit goods in large quantities at 
minimal costs and use online platforms to 
easily and effectively market their products 
internationally. Counterfeiting and piracy 
are terms used to describe a range of illicit 
activities related to Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) infringement. Most counterfeit 
goods infringe a trademark, which means 
that a good is produced without the 
authorisation of its rights holder. OCGs are 
increasingly involved in the violation of IPR.
OCGs produce a wide range of counterfeit 
goods and manufacture sub-standards 
goods distributed on EU markets including 
food and beverages, pesticides and 
pharmaceutical products. Counterfeit and 
sub-standard goods pose significant risks to 
the health and safety of consumers. 
China remains the source country of most 
of the counterfeit goods trafficked to the 
EU. The trade in goods between the EU and 
China has expanded significantly in recent 
years. China is the biggest source of imports 
to the EU by far.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CRIME 
Thousands of online shops are 
used to sell counterfeit goods. 
In 2016, Operation In Our Sites 
(IOS) resulted in the seizure 
of 4,780 domain names and 
associated online shops selling 
counterfeit merchandise.
The distribution of counterfeit 
pharmaceutical products online 
is particularly dangerous. In 
2016, Operation Pangea IX 
specifically targeted online 
vendors of counterfeit 
medicines. The operation 
resulted in the seizure 
of potentially dangerous 
medicines worth more than 
EUR 50 million.
Online distriDution
Online marketplaces are the key 
distribution channel for counterfeit goods. 
The sales volume of counterfeit goods 
online has increased significantly over 
recent years. Counterfeiters use social 
media platforms to advertise their products 
and steer potential consumers to online 
sales platforms. The sale of counterfeit 
goods online is closely related to the 
increasing use of parcel and postal services 
to distribute counterfeit products, which is 
difficult to detect among an increasing flow 
of licit goods sold online and sent via postal 
freight. 
Counterfeit RJarmaceuticals
While the counterfeiting of 
pharmaceuticals previously primarily 
affected lifestyle medicines, counterfeiters 
increasingly target almost all types of 
medicinal products including cancer 
medication and various types of medical 
devices.
Counterfeit goods not only cause 
losses in unpaid duties and 
taxes, but also reduce the sales 
volume, proﬁts and investments 
of legitimate businesses. This 
removes incentives for investment 
in research, development and 
innovation.
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ORGANISED PROPERTY CRIME 
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OCGs make use of various online 
services to facilitate their burglaries. 
This includes checking on social media 
platforms whether individuals are away 
from targeted residences, scouting 
targeted neighbourhoods using free 
online navigation tools and fencing 
goods via online marketplaces.
In September 2015, Europol supported 
French, Belgian and Moldovan law 
enforcement authorities in disrupting the 
activities of a Moldovan OCG carrying 
out serial burglaries targeting bicycle 
shops. The offenders typically stole luxury 
bikes worth more than EUR 10,000 each. 
The bikes were transported from Paris 
to Moldova on long-distance passenger 
busses. The bikes were eventually sold in 
Ukraine as well as via online marketplaces. 
This OCG was highly mobile and operated 
with a strict division of tasks between 
group members.
Organised property crime encompasses 
a range of different criminal activities 
carried out predominantly by mobile 
OCGs operating across the EU. Organised 
burglaries, thefts and robberies as well as 
motor vehicle crime and the trafficking 
of cultural goods all fall into this broad 
category of criminal activity. However, the 
OCGs carrying different types of property 
crime are also highly diverse. Some OCGs 
are highly specialised in specific types of 
crime or modi operandi, while others are 
active in several types of property crime 
and other forms of serious and organised 
crime. MOCGs typically operate in and 
predominantly target the most prosperous 
Member States in Western and Northern 
Europe. Despite the highly organised 
nature of MOCG operations, the organised 
crime involvement in property crimes 
remains under-investigated. In many 
cases, incidents of property crime are 
still classified as petty criminality without 
recognising the organised crime aspect. 
Online marketplaces have made it easier 
to advertise and sell stolen goods. These 
marketplaces are now used extensively 
to sell stolen goods, particularly low-bulk 
high-value goods such as phones, tablets 
and other electronic equipment. Legal 
business structures are used extensively to 
fence stolen goods, often in the country of 
origin of the MOCGs involved in organised 
burglaries and thefts. 
Organised Durglaries and tJefts
Some Member States note a steady 
increase in the number of reported 
burglaries over recent years. This increase 
particularly affects business premises, 
which are targeted much more frequently 
than before. Burglaries of business 
premises often involve intrusion into the 
property via the roof.
Many incidents of pickpocketing are not 
attributed to organised crime. However, 
the scale and level of organisation of 
pickpocketing raids across many Member 
States suggests that MOCGs are heavily 
involved.
Organised roDDeries
MOCGs are increasingly targeting commercial premises for armed robberies, which 
typically have less sophisticated security measures in place. Attacks on banks and other 
cash-intensive businesses have declined notably in recent years due to the security 
measures put into place at their locations. 
Jewellery stores and other businesses selling highly valuable and compact goods remain 
popular targets for armed robbers using various methods of attack including smash and 
grab. 
LOGICAL ATTACKS ON ATMS
As part of a new modus operandi, attackers drill or burn small holes into the ATM case in 
order to reach the ATM’s computer hardware components. The attackers use this access to 
intrude into ATM’s operating system and force it to dispense cash.
OCGs increasingly rely on 
technical tools and expertise to 
overcome new vehicle security 
measures.
/otor XeJicle crime
The theft and fraudulent acquisition of motor 
vehicles remains a lucrative business for the 
various OCGs involved in this criminal activity. 
Some OCGs steal specific vehicles to order for 
clients based in destination countries. While 
the overall number of stolen vehicles appears 
to have remained stable in many Member 
States over recent years, the number of 
recovered vehicles has dropped considerably 
across several Member States. This trend 
likely indicates a further shift from individual 
offenders to the involvement of more 
professional OCGs.
ELECTRONIC COMPROMISE
OCGs involved in the theft of motor vehicles 
increasingly rely on high-tech tools to gain 
access to vehicles and to overcome security 
measures. Information on how to overcome 
car security systems can be easily found on 
online messaging boards and websites. In 
many cases, the tools used for electronic 
compromise are readily available to order 
online and often originate from China.
Some OCGs steal cars as part of burglaries 
and home jacking attempts. MOCGs target 
residential homes with high-value cars parked 
outside, breaking and entering these premises 
to retrieve the original car keys and steal 
the vehicle. Vehicle theft is intimately linked 
to document fraud. OCGs use fraudulent 
documents to give stolen cars new identities 
for registration or exportation purposes.
The trade in spare parts is 
increasingly taking place on 
online marketplaces. OCGs have 
adapted to this and now rely 
on these platforms to sell the 
cannibalised spare parts from 
stolen vehicles.
The illegal online trade 
in cultural goods is 
expanding.
3,561 ARTEFACTS SEIZED IN 
OPERATION PANDORA 28
In January 2017, Europol joined forces 
with law enforcement authorities from 
18 countries, Interpol, the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), and the World 
Customs Organization (WCO) to tackle the 
theft and illicit trafficking of cultural goods. 
Operation Pandora was successfully led by 
Cypriot and Spanish police:
 ͧ 3,561 works of art and cultural goods 
were seized, almost half of which 
were archaeological objects; 500 
archaeological objects were found in 
Murcia, Spain, of which 19 were stolen in 
2014 from the Archaeological Museum 
in Murcia;
 ͧ over 400 coins from different periods 
were seized following investigations into 
suspicious online advertisements.
Several of the retrieved artefacts are 
of great cultural importance in the 
archaeological world, such as a marble 
Ottoman tombstone and a post-Byzantine 
icon depicting Saint George, along with two 
Byzantine artefacts. All of them were seized 
in Greece during actions carried out by the 
Hellenic Police.
Cultural goods trafﬁcking
The conflicts in Libya, Syria and Iraq are 
thought to have resulted in the intensified 
trafficking of cultural goods from this region 
to the EU. This trend is expected to continue 
due to persistent instability in the region and 
the lack of law enforcement resources to 
prevent or intercept trafficking activities in 
origin and transit countries. A small portion 
of the funds generated by cultural goods 
trafficking in the Middle East and North Africa 
region could potentially be used to support 
terrorist organisations. However, the profits 
achieved from cultural goods trafficking for 
these organisations are thought to be low 
compared to other revenue streams. 
WAR CRIMES
In some cases, the destruction, removal and 
trafficking of cultural goods in the context of 
an armed conflict can amount to a war crime. 
Significant cultural goods are protected by 
international law. International humanitarian 
law and international criminal law have 
established various forms of attack against 
cultural property as war crimes. Activities 
related to the destruction or trafficking of 
cultural goods amounting to war crimes 
potentially have an impact on the EU. The 
deliberate destruction of archaeological and 
cultural heritage in Palmyra as well as other 
places in Syria and Iraq could potentially 
be considered a war crime according to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.27 Subsequently, law enforcement 
authorities seized cultural goods originating 
from Palmyra and trafficked to Europe.
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OPERATION PANDORA
Armed conflicts, economic and 
population pressures in Africa and 
the Middle East will continue to 
act as the main push factors for 
irregular migrants travelling to the 
EU. Migrant smuggling to and within 
the EU will remain a key criminal 
threat.
The number of unaccompanied 
minors present in the EU has 
increased signiﬁcantly in recent 
years as a result of the migration 
crisis. This group is very vulnerable 
to all types of exploitation.
Migrant smuggling has emerged as a 
highly profitable and widespread criminal 
activity for organised crime in the EU. The 
migrant smuggling business is now a large, 
profitable and sophisticated criminal market, 
comparable to the European drug markets.
The demand for and supply of smuggling 
services has grown significantly since 2014. 
More than 510,000 illegal border crossings 
between border-crossing points at the 
external border of the EU were registered 
in 2016.29 This is a substantial decrease 
compared to 2015, when over one million 
irregular migrants entered the EU on 
the Eastern Mediterranean and Central 
Mediterranean routes.30 Nearly all of the 
irregular migrants arriving in the EU along 
these routes use the services offered by 
criminal networks at some point during their 
journeys. 
During 2016, 1,234,558 applications for 
asylum were recorded in the EU. In 2015, 
the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 
reported just over 295,000 positive decisions 
on asylum applications by Member States.31 
This means that a large number of irregular 
migrants who did not apply for asylum 
or whose applications were rejected may 
attempt to stay illegally in the EU. 
In addition to the transportation of migrants, 
document fraud has emerged as a key 
criminal activity linked to the migration crisis. 
The provision of fraudulent documents will 
continue to represent a substantial threat to 
the security of the EU. Fraudulent documents 
are used and can be re-used for many 
different criminal offences.
PEOPLE AS COMMODITY 
MIGRANT SMUGGLING
MIGRANT SMUGGLING 
ROUTES
SO
U
R
C
E:
 E
U
R
O
PO
L 
 IN
FO
R
M
AT
IO
N
 (2
01
7)
EU SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 2017       49
/igrant smuggling Ť a daily 
Dusiness 
In 2015, migrant smuggling networks offering 
facilitation services to reach or move within 
the EU generated an estimated EUR 4.7 billion 
to EUR 5.7 billion in profit. These profits have 
seen a sharp decline in 2016, dropping by 
nearly EUR 2 billion between 2015 and 2016. 
This development is in line with the overall 
decrease in the number of irregular migrants 
arriving in the EU and as a result of a fall in 
the prices for migrant smuggling services 
following the peak of the migration crisis in 
2015. 
OCGs involved in migrant smuggling display 
an unprecedented level of organisation and 
coordination. While established smuggling 
modi operandi remain unchanged, migrant 
smugglers have shown great versatility in the 
means of transport, concealment methods 
and technologies they use.
Migrant smuggling is a multi-national busi-
ness. Migrant smugglers originating from over 
122 countries are involved in facilitating the 
journeys of irregular migrants to the EU. Most 
migrant smuggling networks are composed 
of various nationalities involving both EU and 
non-EU nationals. 
Migrant smuggling networks heavily rely on 
social media to advertise smuggling services. 
Migrant smugglers make use of ride-sharing 
applications and P2P accommodation plat-
forms to provide a cover for their smuggling 
activities. This leaves regular users at the 
risk of inadvertently becoming facilitators by 
unknowingly transporting or hosting irregular 
migrants.
Migrant smuggling is a highly profitable crim-
inal activity featuring sustained high levels of 
demand and relatively low levels of risk. Some 
OCGs previously involved in other criminal 
activities such as the illegal trade in excise 
goods, drug trafficking or organised property 
crime have added migrant smuggling to their 
portfolio of criminal activities. Migrant smug-
gling does not require access to significant 
resources and OCGs can rely on their existing 
knowledge of routes and infrastructure 
used to smuggle goods across borders. The 
distinction between legal and illegal activities 
is increasingly blurred. Individual criminal 
entrepreneurs can step in and out of criminal 
activities by providing ad hoc services, espe-
cially taxi and truck drivers.  
OPERATION DAIDALOS
In March 2015, Operation Daidalos 
targeted a criminal group smuggling 
irregular migrants from Greece to other 
Member States which was involved in the 
production and distribution of forged travel 
documents. In addition to providing these 
documents to irregular migrants, the group 
also sold these to other OCGs. The criminal 
network operated primarily in Greece. 
+llegal Dut not undocumented Ť 
document and identity fraud
Service packages offered by migrant smug-
glers now frequently include the provision 
of fraudulent travel and identity documents. 
Fraudulent documents allow irregular mi-
grants to enter and move within the EU as 
well as to change from irregular to legalised 
residence status under false pretences or 
by using fake identities. Migrant smuggling 
networks are increasingly offering tailor-made 
facilitation services including high-quality 
fraudulent documents.
The abuse of genuine passports by look-alikes 
continues to be the main modus operandi 
used by document fraudsters. ID cards are 
the most commonly detected document used 
as part of document fraud. In 2015, they ac-
counted for 50% of all detections in the EU. In 
2016, more than 7,000 people were detected 
with fraudulent documents on entry at the 
external borders of the EU.32
#n emerging market
Both the quantity and the quality of fraud-
ulent documents circulating in the EU have 
increased. The sustained increase in demand 
for fraudulent documents has prompted 
established counterfeiters to increase their 
production output and establish new print 
shops. 
#Duse of legal cJannels
Migrant smugglers frequently abuse legal 
channels to facilitate the entry of irregular 
migrants to the EU or to legalise their stay. 
The abuse of legal channels involves a variety 
of modi operandi including sham marriages, 
bogus paternity, false employment contracts, 
fake invitations letters, false medical visa, 
and false claims to be victims of trafficking or 
refugees. 
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BUSINESS MODEL
Supply of fraudulent documents
Migrant hands over his 
bio data and a photograph 
eletronically
Facilitator sends 
details to the 
forger
Forger procures passport and 
applies a fake visa, stamp and 
bio data on the document
Facilitator hands the 
passport to the migrant 
in exchange for fee
Migrant smugglers widely rely on 
social media and use online 
platforms such as ride-sharing 
websites, or P2P accommodation 
platforms, to arrange facilitation 
services.
Migrants smugglers pass 
irregular migrants from one 
network to another along the 
route of the migrants’ journey.
EU suspects typically work as 
drivers transporting irregular 
migrants within the EU to 
destination countries.
Document fraud has emerged as a 
key criminal activity linked to the 
migration crisis. 
 
The demand for smuggling 
services has grown 
signiﬁcantly since 2014. 
DOCUMENT 
FRAUD
COMMUNICATION
VIA SOCIAL MEDIA
TRANSPORTATION
& ACCOMMODATION
Migrant smuggling networks offer their services including 
transportation, accommodation, the provision of fraudulent 
documents and information on contact points in other countries. 
FACILITATION
SERVICES
 
/igrant smuggling to and 
YitJin tJe '7 Yill remain a 
key criminal tJreat 
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THB for sexual and labour exploitation 
includes the recruitment, transportation, 
harbouring and exploitation of victims. 
OCGs involved in THB typically operate 
in independent cells that deal with the 
various stages of recruitment, transport and 
exploitation. 
Traffickers rely heavily on document fraud to 
enable their trafficking activities. This includes 
the use of fraudulent identity, travel and 
breeder documents as well as the abuse of 
legal channels such as the EU visa regime for 
tourism, study and work visas. OCGs involved 
in THB also continue to exploit asylum 
provisions in order to traffic non-EU nationals 
into the EU. On many occasions, victims 
are provided with fraudulent documents to 
conceal their real identity and age.
6*$ for seZual eZRloitation 
The sexual exploitation of EU nationals no 
longer relies predominantly on the use 
of violence and coercion towards victims. 
Some OCGs are increasingly relying on 
threats of violence towards victims and their 
families rather than attacking the victim. 
Victims originating from outside the EU are 
still routinely subjected to violence, debt 
bondage, passport confiscation and other 
forms of coercion as an integral part of 
trafficking modi operandi.     
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CRIMINAL GANG ACCUSED OF 
TRAFFICKING OVER 150 WOMEN 
INTO PROSTITUTION DISMANTLED BY 
AUSTRIA33
In November 2016, Austrian law 
enforcement authorities with the support 
of Europol dismantled a Chinese OCG 
involved in the trafficking of up to 300 
women. Victims were lured to Austria 
on promises of work as nannies or 
masseuses. They were provided with 
forged documents and brought to Austria 
illegally. Upon their arrival in Vienna, OCG 
members took away the victims’ IDs. The 
women were placed in so-called “sex 
studios” owned by the OCG and forced 
to work as prostitutes. After a few weeks 
they were transferred to other brothels in 
Austria.
The migration crisis has resulted 
in an increase in the number 
of potential victims of THB. A 
growing number of vulnerable 
adults and unaccompanied 
minors in the EU are likely to be 
targeted by trafﬁckers. 
The trafﬁcking of victims within 
the EU remains a key threat.
TRAFFICKING VICTIMS FORCED INTO CRIMINALITY 34
In November 2016, a Spanish investigation supported by Europol resulted in the arrest of 16 
suspected traffickers and the rescue of nine minors. The OCG trafficked young women and 
forced them into pickpocketing in various Member States. The victims were initially lured to 
Spain and travelled there using counterfeit documents. In Spain, the traffickers trained the 
victims in pickpocketing techniques and forced them to commit thefts in crowded areas and 
on public transport. The OCG shared family ties and was hierarchically structured operating 
in smaller groups in different European cities. The larger criminal network was mainly 
composed of nationals from Bosnia and Herzegovina and traded the victims from one group 
to another for an estimated EUR 5,000 each. 
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6*$ for laDour eZRloitation 
The involvement of OCGs in THB for labour 
exploitation is increasing in the EU. OCGs 
cater to the growing demand for cheap labour 
across many Member States and have access 
to a large number of potential victims. THB 
for labour exploitation threatens to infiltrate 
the legal economy, where it lowers wages and 
hampers economic growth. 
THE BUSINESS MODEL
There has been little change in the types 
of industries featuring labour exploitation. 
Traffickers continue to target less regulated 
industries as well as those featuring seasonal 
demand for workers. Vulnerable sectors 
include agriculture, catering, cleaning, 
construction, entertainment, fishing, 
hospitality, retail and transportation. 
Traffickers take advantage of discrepancies in 
labour legislation to organise the exploitation 
of victims in the grey zone between legal 
employment and labour exploitation. Some 
victims receive wages equivalent to the 
minimum standard in their countries of origin. 
However, these are far below acceptable 
salaries in countries of exploitation where 
they do not have sufficient resources to cover 
their living expenses. These wage dumping 
practices seriously undermine the legal labour 
market in countries of destination and make 
it difficult for victims of labour exploitation to 
be recognised as such.  
6rafﬁcking of underage Xictims
Traffickers often specifically target underage 
victims, both male and female, to sexually 
exploit them. The exploitation of underage 
victims is not always motivated by financial 
profit. In some cases, underage victims are 
trafficked for the purpose of producing CSEM, 
which is traded on online platforms. 
MIGRANT SMUGGLING AND HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING RING OPERATING VIA 
THE MEDITERRANEAN 35
In November 2015, a joint operation 
between Spanish and Polish law enforcement 
authorities, coordinated by Europol, revealed 
the operation of a migrant smuggling network 
exploiting irregular migrants from Pakistan 
in restaurants in Spain. Irregular migrants 
were forced to work long hours in appalling 
conditions without salary, holiday or social 
security to repay their debts to smugglers 
for the travel and provision of fraudulent 
documents. The migrant smugglers used 
the criminal proceeds to invest in new 
restaurants, which were also used for the 
exploitation of irregular migrants. 
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Links between migrant 
smuggling and trafficking in 
human beings
OCGs involved in THB often exploit existing 
migratory routes to traffic victims within the 
EU. While the migration crisis has not yet 
had a widespread impact on THB for labour 
exploitation in the EU, some investigations 
show that traffickers are increasingly targeting 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers in the 
EU for exploitation. Irregular migrants in the 
EU represent a large pool of potential victims 
susceptible to promises of work even if this 
entails exploitation. 
SHAM MARRIAGES
There has been an increasing number of 
reports of incidents of sham marriages in 
several Member States. This increase is likely 
related to the migration crisis and an increase 
in the number of irregular migrants seeking to 
transition to legal residence status after failed 
asylum applications.
Trafﬁckers continue to rely on the use of social media, Voice-over-IP (VoIP) and instant messaging 
applications at all stages of the trafﬁcking cycle.
The traditional trafﬁcking flow from 
Eastern Europe to Western Europe 
has been replaced by multiple and 
diverse flows of victims all over the 
EU.
OCGs have further increased 
the use of legal businesses 
that can conceal exploitations 
such as hotels, nightclubs and 
massage parlours.
LABOUR EXPLOITATION SEXUAL EXPLOITATION CHILD TRAFFICKING
Trafﬁckers continue to target less 
regulated industries as well as those 
featuring seasonal demand for 
workers. 
Trafﬁckers often speciﬁcally 
target underage victims, both 
male and female, to sexually 
exploit them. 
THB for labour exploitation is 
increasing in the EU. 
MIGRANT SMUGGLING
TRAFFICKING IN 
HUMAN BEINGS
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SPORTS 
CORRUPTION
Criminal networks use match-fixing 
to manipulate the outcomes of sports 
matches, which skews betting odds and 
allows them to generate significant profits. 
Match-fixing in the EU primarily affects 
football games. However, match-fixers are 
also targeting tennis, snooker and dart 
competitions. 
In some cases OCGs have infiltrated 
sporting clubs in order to orchestrate 
money laundering schemes.
FOOTBALL AND MONEY LAUNDERING
In May 2016, as part of Operation 
Matrioskas, law enforcement authorities 
dismantled a Russian-speaking OCG which 
had infiltrated football clubs and laundered 
several million euros across the EU. The 
OCG used middlemen to purchase football 
clubs experiencing financial pressure. The 
group was able to conceal their money 
laundering activities among the large 
financial transactions and cross-border 
money flows, which are not unusual 
for professional football clubs. Weak 
governance allowed the OCG to use the 
clubs to launder money by over- or under-
valuating players on the transfer market 
as well as by accepting bids for television 
rights deals. 
TRAFFICKING 
OF FIREARMS
The proliferation and availability 
of illegal ﬁrearms in the /ember 
States increases the risk of their 
use by terrorist groups to carry 
out attacks in the EU.
Illegal ﬁrearms are increasingly 
accessible due to their 
availability online.
Recent terrorist attacks in the EU carried out 
by jihadist terrorists using trafficked firearms 
have demonstrated the lethal consequences 
of the trade in illicit firearms. Several 
incidents of violent clashes between criminal 
gangs have highlighted that the use of illegal 
firearms remains a significant threat to EU 
citizens.
ONLINE TRADE
Firearms are frequently traded on online 
platforms including Darknet marketplaces. 
Both individual criminals and OCGs obtain 
illegal firearms via online marketplaces. This 
development has resulted in a significant 
increase in the use of parcel and postal 
services to traffic firearms and firearm 
components.
Online trade allows individuals with no or 
limited connections to organised crime to 
procure firearms. These individual criminal 
actors increasingly engage in the trafficking of 
firearms and firearm components as part of 
a CaaS business model and have emerged as 
key distributors of illegal firearms in the EU. 
The online trade in illegal firearms via various 
platforms is set to expand further over the 
coming years.
Using post and parcel services 
is now the most common way of 
trafﬁcking ﬁrearms in the E7. 
DIVERSION FROM LEGAL SUPPLY
Firearms traffickers are highly adept at 
exploiting legal loopholes and differences 
in regulatory regimes between Member 
States to divert firearms from legal 
suppliers. The reactivation of deactivated 
weapons and conversion of blank-firing 
firearms are among the main sources 
of illegal firearms trafficked in the EU. 
Firearms traffickers often convert blank-
firing firearms or reactivate deactivated 
firearms purchased from legal dealers 
based in countries applying less stringent 
acquisition rules such as more permissive 
licensing and registration requirements.
Various conflict zones in the periphery of 
the EU have the potential to emerge as 
major sources of firearms trafficked to 
the EU.
In June 2016, Italian law enforcement 
authorities arrested two members of the 
mafia clan ‘Ceusi’ on charges of firearms 
trafficking. The suspects had purchased 
over 160 decommissioned firearms 
from Slovakia. Some of the firearms 
were reactivated and sent to Malta in 
parcels. The Italian OCG maintained links 
with Egyptian OCGs involved in migrant 
smuggling activities.36
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LINKS BETWEEN SERIOUS AND 
ORGANISED CRIME AND 
TERRORISM
Terrorism and the groups carrying out 
terrorist offences have evolved significantly 
over the last decade. The EU has been the 
target of repeated terror attacks and plots 
in recent years. The investigations into the 
terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris, carried 
out in March 2016 and November 2015 
respectively, uncovered the involvement of 
some of the perpetrators in different types 
of serious and organised crime including the 
trafficking of illicit drugs, as well as personal 
contacts with criminal groups involved in 
the trafficking of  firearms and production of 
fraudulent documents. 
Recent investigations have revealed that 
terrorist groups have made use of migrant 
smuggling networks to allow their operatives 
to enter the EU. However, these cases do 
not suggest that terrorist groups maintain 
sustained engagement with OCGs involved in 
migrant smuggling.
The profit-driven nature of organised crime 
activities is in many cases incompatible with 
terrorist acts, which attract a great degree of 
media and law enforcement attention to the 
perpetrators.
The pursuit of criminal activities in support of 
terrorist activities is not a new phenomenon. 
However, the involvement of suspects with 
extensive criminal backgrounds and access 
to the resources and tools of organised 
crime networks in terrorism is particularly 
threatening in light of the fast pace of 
radicalisation and willingness to very quickly 
engage in terrorist attack following the 
beginning of the radicalisation process. 
The threat emanating from links between 
serious and organised crime and terrorism 
is two-fold. Firstly, the potential exploitation 
of OCG infrastructures to procure tools, such 
as firearms or fraudulent documents, and 
move goods and people may deliver lethal 
weapons used in attacks in the EU to terrorist 
groups. Secondly, involvement in serious and 
organised crime may allow terrorist actors to 
generate funds to finance terrorism-related 
activities.
The suspects are involved in various crime 
areas including money laundering, migrant 
smuggling, heroin and firearms trafficking, 
organised property crime and THB. These 
suspects are typically involved at a low level 
in organised crime and do not fill major roles 
within organised crime networks.  
CONCLUSIONS
Tackling organised crime in the 
age of technology
Serious and organised crime is a key 
threat to the security of the EU. Criminal 
groups and individual criminals continue 
to generate multi-billion euro profits 
from their activities in the EU each year. 
Some parts of the serious and organised 
crime landscape in the EU have changed 
drastically in the past years - in large part 
due to advancements in technology that 
have had a profound impact on the wider 
society and economy. 
Technology is a key component of most, 
if not all, criminal activities carried out 
by organised crime groups in the EU and 
has afforded organised crime with an 
unprecedented degree of flexibility. This 
flexibility is particularly apparent in the 
ease with which criminals adapt to changes 
in society. 
The internet, the multitude of online 
platforms and communication channels it 
hosts have had a huge impact on society, 
strengthening and transforming the 
economy, driving innovation and shaping 
social interaction. However, it is also a key 
enabler of criminal activity and plays a role 
in all types of criminality. 
The impact of technology on crime, 
however, extends beyond the internet and 
involves all kinds of technical innovation 
such as advances in drone technology, 
automated logistics, and advanced printing 
technologies.
The role of the SOCTA
The vital role of technology for organised 
crime is reflected in the data collected 
and analysed for the SOCTA 2017. For the 
SOCTA 2017, Europol has undertaken the 
largest-ever data collection on serious and 
organised crime in the EU. 
Europol relied on more than 2,300 
questionnaires contributed by Member 
States, Europol’s operational and 
strategic partners outside the EU and our 
institutional partners as well as operational 
intelligence held in Europol’s databases to 
produce the most detailed assessment of 
the nature and scale of criminal threats 
facing the EU and its Member States yet. 
Based on an in-depth analysis of this 
data and a methodology endorsed by the 
Member States, Europol identifies the key 
threats from serious and organised crime 
facing the EU today and over the coming 
years.
RECOMMENDED 
PRIORITIES
Based on the outcome of a 
comprehensive analysis of the 
indicators and factors detailed in 
the SOCTA Methodology, Europol 
recommends key priorities to 
tackle the most threatening 
forms of serious and organised 
crime. In addition to five specific 
criminal activities carried out 
by organised crime in the EU, 
Europol is also recommending 
to focus on three cross-cutting 
threats that enable or enhance 
all types of serious and 
organised crime.
56
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SPECIFIC PRIORITY CRIME 
THREATS:
Cybercrime
Drug production, trafficking and distribution
Migrant smuggling
Organised property crime
Trafficking in human being
CROSS-CUTTING PRIORITY CRIME 
THREATS:
Criminal finances and money laundering
Document fraud
Online trade in illicit goods and services
HIGH THREAT THREAT
TH
RE
AT
S
CR
OS
S-
CU
TT
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G
CR
IM
E 
TH
RE
AT
S
CRIME AREAS Currency counterfeiting CYBERCRIME
Drug
trafﬁcking
Environmental 
crime Fraud
Intellectual
property crime
ORGANISED
PROPERTY CRIME
MIGRANT
SMUGGLING
Trafﬁcking of
ﬁrearms
TRAFFICKING IN
 HUMAN BEINGS
Corruption
Criminal ﬁnances including money laundering
Document fraud, including identity fraud
Online trade in illicit goods (ﬁrearms, counterfeit goods, drugs)
Extortion
Countermeasures against law enforcement
Illicit waste
trafﬁcking
Production
Trafﬁcking of 
endangered
species
Distribution 
including 
online
Burglaries and
theft
Online trade in 
counterfeit
goods
Excise fraud
Motorvehicle
crime
Production of
counterfeit 
goods in the 
EU
Investment
fraud
Organised
robberies
Trafﬁcking of 
counterfeit
goods (not 
online) in the
EU
MTIC fraud
External 
borders of the
EU
Secondary
movements
Risk for labour
exploitation
Labour
exploitation
Sexual
exploitation
Child 
trafﬁcking
Online child
sexual 
exploitation
Cyber-
dependent
crime
(malware, 
cryptoware, etc.)
Payment card
fraud (card-not-
present fraud)
Synthetic drugs
production in 
the EU
Trafﬁcking of
precursors and
pre-precursors
Import of 
cocaine to the
EU via major
ports and
couriers
Poly-drug
trafﬁcking in 
the EU
Large-scale
cannabis 
production and 
trafﬁcking in 
the EU
Online trade
(including 
de/reactiva-
tion)
Traditional 
trafﬁcking
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ANNEX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ATM Automated teller machine
AWF SOC Analytical Work File on Serious and Organised Crime
CaaS Crime-as-a-Service
CNP Card-not-present
COSI Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security
CP Card-present
CSE Child Sexual Exploitation
CSEM Child Sexual Exploitation Material
DDoS Distributed denial of service
EASO European #sylum Support Ofﬁce 
ECB European Central Bank
EMCDDA European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EMCS Excise Movement and Control System
EU European Union
IPR Intellectual Property Rights
LDCA Long-distance child abuse
MDMA 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine
MOCG Mobile organised crime group
MTIC Missing Trader Intra Community
NFC Near Field Communication
NPS New Psychoactive Substances
OCG Organised crime group
P2P Peer-to-peer
POS Point of Sale
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SOCTA Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment
THB Trafﬁcking in *uman Beings
TOR The Onion Router
VAT Value Added Tax
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